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Market Power and Inequality: The Antitrust
Counterrevolution and Its Discontents
Lina Khan* and Sandeep Vaheesan**
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, economic inequality has become a central topic of pub-
lic debate in the United States and much of the developed world. The popu-
larity of Thomas Piketty’s nearly 700-page tome, Capital in the Twenty-First
Century, is a testament to this newfound focus on economic disparity.1 As
top intellectuals, politicians, and public figures have come to recognize ine-
quality as a major problem that must be addressed, they have offered a range
of potential solutions. Frequently mentioned proposals include reforming the
tax system, strengthening organized labor, revising international trade and
investment agreements, and reducing the size of the financial sector.2
One underexplored theme in this larger debate is the role of monopoly
and oligopoly power.3 Given the current distribution of business ownership
assets in the United States, market power can be a powerful mechanism for
transferring wealth from the many among the working and middle classes to
* Fellow, Open Markets Program, New America; Yale Law School, J.D., expected 2017;
Williams College, B.A., 2010.
** Regulations Counsel, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. This article reflects the
views of the authors alone and not necessarily those of New America, the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau, or the United States. For thoughtful feedback on earlier drafts of the article,
we are deeply grateful to Ken Davidson, Ben Douglas, Bert Foer, Barry C. Lynn, Michael
Oswalt, Frank Pasquale, and Marshall Steinbaum.
1
THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2013). Piketty and his pub-
lisher expected that twenty thousand copies of his book would be sold—instead more than two
million copies were sold around the world. See J. Bradford DeLong, The Melting Away of
North Atlantic Social Democracy, TALKING POINTS MEMO (Feb. 21, 2016), http://talkingpoint-
smemo.com/features/marchtoinequality/fourmeltingsocialdemocracy/ [https://perma.cc/
MSV5-DWK7].
2 See generally ANTHONY B. ATKINSON, INEQUALITY: WHAT CAN BE DONE? (2015).
3 A few commentators have drawn attention to this connection. See, e.g., Jonathan B.
Baker & Steven C. Salop, Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Inequality, 104 GEO. L.J. 1,
10–13 (2015); David Dayen, The Most Important 2016 Issue You Don’t Know About, NEW
REPUBLIC (Mar. 11, 2016), https://newrepublic.com/article/131412/important-2016-issue-dont-
know [https://perma.cc/DN43-E3FK]; Paul Krugman, Robber Baron Recessions, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 18, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/18/opinion/robber-baron-recessions.html?
_r=0 [https://perma.cc/AMU4-Y9UT]. More recently, a series of reports from the White
House have also acknowledged the potential connection between a decline in competitive mar-
kets and a rise in economic inequality. See, e.g., THE WHITE HOUSE, COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC
ADVISERS ISSUE BRIEF, LABOR MARKET MONOPSONY: TRENDS, CONSEQUENCES, AND POLICY
RESPONSES (2016). Additionally, Senator Elizabeth Warren has observed that rising consolida-
tion contributes to inequality. Elizabeth Warren, Senator of Massachusetts, Keynote Remarks
at New America’s Open Market Program Event: Reigniting Competition in the American
Economy (June 29, 2016) (“Concentration is not the only reason for rising economic insecu-
rity, but it is one of them.”) (transcript available at http://washingtonmonthly.com/2016/06/30/
elizabeth-warrens-consolidation-speech-could-change-the-election/ [https://perma.cc/TAW8-
F2PQ]).
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the few belonging to the 1% and 0.1% at the top of the income and wealth
distribution. In concrete terms, monopoly pricing on goods and services
turns the disposable income of the many into capital gains, dividends, and
executive compensation for the few. Evidence across a number of key indus-
tries in the United States indicates that excessive market power is a serious
problem. Firms in industries ranging from agriculture to airlines collude,
merge and exclude rivals, and raise consumer prices above competitive
levels, while pushing prices below competitive levels for suppliers. The ag-
gregate wealth transfer effect from pervasive monopoly and oligopoly power
is likely, at a minimum, hundreds of billions of dollars per year.
On top of enabling regressive redistribution in the marketplace, market
power gives firms tremendous political clout. In a system with few cam-
paign finance constraints and a revolving door between government and in-
dustry, large businesses have tremendous power over politics. They can use
their power to push legislators and regulators to lock in their existing gains
and lobby for policies that further enhance their wealth and power. This
article takes as its premise that the degree of economic inequality we con-
front today is highly problematic. Even bracketing its moral undesirability,
extreme economic inequality subverts political equality and threatens Amer-
ican democracy.4
The domination of our markets by monopolists and oligopolists was not
inevitable. As David Singh Grewal has written, “Capitalism is fundamen-
tally a legal ordering: the bargains at the heart of capitalism are products of
law.”5 In accordance with this understanding of capitalism, monopoly and
oligopoly are the result of conscious policy and political choices, tracing
back to an intellectual movement in the 1960s, advanced by the courts in the
late 1970s, implemented systematically by the administration of President
Reagan in the 1980s, and followed by subsequent administrations. With the
appointment of numerous conservatives to the federal antitrust agencies and
judiciary, the Reagan administration ushered in a radical revision of the anti-
trust laws that previously promoted competitive markets.6 Antitrust laws his-
torically sought to protect consumers and small suppliers from
noncompetitive pricing, preserve open markets to all comers, and disperse
economic and political power. The Reagan administration—with no input
from Congress—rewrote antitrust to focus on the concept of neoclassical
economic efficiency.7 In dramatically narrowing the goals of antitrust,
4 See Joseph Fishkin & William Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, 94 B.U. L.
REV. 669 (2014); cf. Ganesh Sitaraman, The Puzzling Absence of Economic Power in Constitu-
tional Theory, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1445 (2016) (arguing that constitutional theories fail to
adequately account for, and suggesting a conceptual framework for mitigating “elite economic
domination”).
5 David Singh Grewal, The Laws of Capitalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 628, 652 (2014).
6 This revision of antitrust was part of the larger global project of freeing capital from the
social democratic fetters of the mid-twentieth century and strengthening its position, vis-à-vis
other segments of society. See generally DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERAL-
ISM (2005).
7 This concept of efficiency (sometimes called “consumer welfare” in the antitrust
community) focuses on short-term maximization of economic output and the prevention of
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executive branch officials and judges held that open-ended standards
favorable to businesses with market power, rather than clear rules, should
govern most forms of business conduct. This elastic standard has crippled
plaintiffs’ attempts to challenge illegal behavior and has permitted large cor-
porations to engage in anticompetitive conduct.
The Reagan administration’s overturning of antitrust has had sweeping
effects. But antitrust laws can be restored to promote competitive markets
once again. Doing so would also produce a more equitable distribution of
wealth and power in American society. This requires two things: first, an
intellectual shift that embraces the original goals of antitrust and second, the
appointment of antitrust officials and federal judges committed to this ap-
proach. A determined administration should do a number of things to revive
Congress’s vision as expressed in 1890 and 1914. First, antitrust laws must
be reoriented away from the current efficiency focus toward a broader un-
derstanding that aims to protect consumers and small suppliers from the
market power of large sellers and buyers, maintain the openness of markets,
and disperse economic and political power. Second, clear rules and pre-
sumptions must govern mergers, dominant firm conduct, and vertical re-
straints and replace the current rule of reason review and other amorphous
standards, which heavily tilt the scales in favor of defendants. Third, by us-
ing existing legal powers or seeking additional authority from Congress, the
agencies should challenge monopoly and oligopoly power that injures the
public on account of duration or magnitude of harm. Fourth, strong structural
remedies and blocking of anticompetitive mergers are necessary to ensure
that competitive markets are restored and maintained. Fifth and finally, anti-
trust agencies must be subject to strong transparency duties to allow the
public to understand the internal decision-making processes and choices
over whether to pursue—or not to pursue—a particular case.
A revived antitrust movement could play an important role in reversing
the dramatic rise in economic inequality. With public engagement and politi-
cal will, the antitrust counterrevolution—which has produced monopolistic
and oligopolistic markets and contributed to a captured political system—
can be undone. To be clear, our argument is not that antitrust should embrace
redistribution as an explicit goal, or that enforcers should harness antitrust in
order to promote progressive redistribution. Instead we hold that the failure
of antitrust to preserve competitive markets contributes to regressive wealth
and income distribution and—similarly—restoring antitrust is likely to have
progressive distributive effects.
inefficiency that arises from “deadweight loss” (mutually beneficial transactions that are not
made due to some market impediment). See John J. Flynn, The Reagan Administration’s Anti-
trust Policy, “Original Intent” and the Legislative History of the Sherman Act, 33 ANTITRUST
BULL. 259, 265–67 (1988). This concept of efficiency is tautological in that it assumes that “if
individuals choose to act in a certain way, that this must de jure be the rational utility-maxi-
mizing choice.” William Davies, Economics and the “Nonsense” of Law: The Case of the
Chicago Antitrust Revolution, 39 ECON. & SOC’Y 64, 70 (2010).
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Recent commentary has sought to refute the connection between lax
antitrust enforcement and growing income inequality by claiming that exer-
cises of market power has “complex crosscutting effects” and therefore can-
not be “robustly generalized” as regressive.8 To be sure, there may be some
instances in which the effects of market power are not straightforwardly re-
gressive. But the idea that market power in several major industries—air-
lines, electricity, pharmaceuticals, telecommunications—may have
progressive or even neutral effects is implausible. Under current economic
arrangements, market power, in general, can be expected to transfer wealth
from ordinary Americans to affluent executives and shareholders. In other
words, market power is likely to have regressive income and wealth effects.
The article proceeds as follows. Part I examines how market power
contributes to economic inequality. Part II provides case studies of anticom-
petitive practices and non-competitive market structures in several key in-
dustries. Part III lays out how economic power often translates into political
power. Part IV traces the political decision, initiated by the courts in the late
1970s and applied comprehensively by the Reagan administration, to narrow
the scope of the antitrust laws—a choice that has permitted large corpora-
tions to dominate our markets and politics. Part V presents a vision of the
antitrust laws that accords with what Congress intended in enacting these
landmark statutes and offers specific policy prescriptions.
I. HOW MARKET POWER CONTRIBUTES TO ECONOMIC INEQUALITY
Economics identifies two major ways in which firms with market
power can harm society: first, by reducing output below the socially optimal
level (the efficiency effect)9, and second, by raising prices (the distributional
effect).10 The dollar amount of the distributional effect is typically several
times larger than the dollar amount of the efficiency effect.11 Moreover,
these higher prices typically transfer wealth from consumers to the firms
with market power, which can redistribute income and wealth upwards. The
reason this redistributive effect tends to be regressive is that the managers
and owners of firms with market power are typically wealthier than the con-
sumers of the products the firms sell.12 To borrow the words of former
8 Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust and Wealth Inequality, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1171, 1176,
1207 (2016).
9 Thomas G. Krattenmaker et al., Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law, 76
GEO. L.J. 241, 250 (1987).
10 Id. at 251.
11 John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, Cartels as Rational Business Strategy: Crime
Pays, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 427, 461 (2012) (estimating based on a number of studies that
wealth transfer effect of cartels is five to thirty-three times larger than efficiency loss).
12 The short-term efficiency and distribution effects are only part of the story and do not
account for the other ills from market power. Non-competitive markets can also subvert long-
term innovation and damage a nation’s political economy more broadly. BARRY C. LYNN,
CORNERED: THE NEW MONOPOLY CAPITALISM AND THE ECONOMICS OF DESTRUCTION 216–55
(2010).
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Federal Reserve Chairman Marriner Eccles, pervasive market power in an
economy is likely to operate as “a giant suction pump . . . draw[ing] into a
few hands an increasing portion of currently produced wealth.”13
The figure below lays out the short-term economic effects of market
power. A market in which suppliers have market power is compared to a
market in which perfect competition prevails.14 Relative to a market with
perfect competition, the equilibrium price is higher and the equilibrium
quantity of output is lower when market power exists. As a result: (1) wealth
is transferred from consumers to firms (the gray rectangle), and (2) eco-
nomic efficiency is reduced (the two white triangles labeled “efficiency
loss”).













Further, in many markets—most notably agriculture—large buyers
have the power to drive prices below the competitive level. In this monop-
sonistic or oligopsonistic scenario, wealth is transferred from suppliers to
purchasers.
The wealth transfer from market power is likely to have regressive
effects. Economic research has found that the ownership of stocks and other
business interests is heavily concentrated among the top 10%, and especially
13
MARRINER S. ECCLES, BECKONING FRONTIERS: PUBLIC AND PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS
76 (1951).
14 Perfect competition is, of course, a textbook ideal that is almost never seen in the real
world. Nonetheless, it provides a baseline for comparison and serves to illustrate how market
power transfers wealth from consumers to firms.
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the top 1% and 0.1% of American families ranked by wealth. Emmanuel
Saez and Gabriel Zucman have estimated that in 2012 the top 10% owned
77.2% of total wealth in the United States, with the top 1% and top 0.1%
accounting for 41.8% and 22%, respectively.15 In other words, the richest
160,000 families together owned nearly as much wealth in stocks, bonds,
pensions, housing, and other assets as the 144 million families in the bottom
90% did as a whole.16 The following chart illustrates the concentrated owner-
ship of business assets. Wealth, including business and non-business assets,
is heavily concentrated at the very top of the distribution. Around seventy-
eight percent of the nation’s wealth is concentrated in the top ten percent of
the population. And as skewed as the overall wealth distribution is, this fig-
ure, in fact, understates the concentration of ownership of business assets
because it includes housing wealth, which is distributed more broadly than
other forms of wealth.17














Top 10% Top 10
to 1%
Top 1% Top 1
to 0.1%
Top 0.1% Top 0.1
to 0.01%
Top .01%
Top 10% Top 1% Top 0.1%
Focusing on income from productive assets, capital income is heavily
concentrated among the top 10% and, in particular, the top 0.1%.19 In 2012,
15 Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since 1913:
Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data 47 (NBER Working Paper No. 20625, 2014),
http://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/SaezZucman2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/HY5K-FVAY].
16 Id.
17 Id. at 58.
18 Figure is based on data from Saez & Zucman, see id. at 49.
19
PIKETTY, supra note 1, at 302. R
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the top 0.1% families, as measured by wealth, received approximately thirty-
three percent of total capital income excluding capital gains and approxi-
mately forty-three percent of total capital income including capital gains.20
In light of this distribution, a large percentage of market power rents likely
flow to a tiny sliver of the American population.
Along with shareholders, top executives also appear to capture a por-
tion of the rents21 from their firm’s market power.22 In recent decades, execu-
tive pay has increased dramatically. The spectacular increases in income for
this group—dubbed “super managers” by Thomas Piketty—has been an im-
portant driver of rising inequality in the United States.23 Due to passivity
among dispersed shareholders and captive boards of directors, chief execu-
tive officers and other top managers have the effective power to set their
own pay.24 A sizable fraction of this increase has come in the form of stock-
based compensation.25 Executives’ discretion over their own pay allows them
to capture a portion of market power rents.26 Economist William Lazonick
has written that “[e]ven when adjusted for inflation, the compensation of
top U.S. executives has doubled or tripled since the first half of the 1990s,
when it was already widely viewed as excessive.”27
Contemporary corporate law and norms encourage managers to retain
market power rents28 among themselves and shareholders. The “shareholder
revolution” of the late 1970s and early 1980s established a tight nexus be-
tween the interests of executives and shareholders—in particular short-term
shareholders—of corporations based or publicly traded in the United
States.29 Corporate law and norms in the United States today, much more so
than in other industrialized nations and even the United States in the mid-
20 Saez & Zucman, supra note 15, at 53.
21 Per a standard economic definition, “rents” refers to profits earned above the amount
that would be earned in a competitive market.
22 Jason Furman & Peter Orszag, Presentation at “A Just Society” Centennial Event in
Honor of Joseph Stiglitz, A Firm-Level Perspective on the Role of Rents in the Rise in Ine-
quality 14 (Oct. 16, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20151016
_firm_level_perspective_on_role_of_rents_in_inequality.pdf [https://perma.cc/LSY8-SMM
G]; see also Gustavo Grullon & Roni Michaely, Corporate Payout Policy and Product Market
Competition 19–20, Am. Fin. Ass’n New Orleans Meetings Paper (Mar. 15, 2007), http://portal
.idc.ac.il/en/main/research/caesareacenter/annualsummit/documents/08-8.pdf [https://perma
.cc/8T6U-TJ2W] (finding that corporations operating in less competitive markets pay out a
smaller fraction of earnings to shareholders than corporations in more competitive markets).
23
PIKETTY, supra note 1, at 302–03. R
24 Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, 21 OXFORD REV.
ECON. POL’Y 283, 300–02 (2005); Marc van Essen et al., Assessing Managerial Power Theory:
A Meta-Analytic Approach to Understanding the Determinants of CEO Compensation, 41 J.
MGMT. 164, 187 (2015).
25 Bebchuk & Grinstein, supra note 24, at 289–90
26 As Bebchuk and Grinstein write, “The aggregate compensation paid by public firms to
their top-five executives was 9.8 per cent of the aggregate earnings of these firms during
2001–3, up from 5 per cent during 1993–5.” Id. at 284.
27 William Lazonick, Profits Without Prosperity, 92 HARV. BUS. REV. 46, 48 (2014).
28 “Market power rents” refers to profits that a company earns by virtue of its market
power and that—absent this market power—it would not earn.
29 Lynn A. Stout, The Toxic Side Effects of Shareholder Primacy, 161 U. PENN. L. REV.
2003, 2008–10 (2013).
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twentieth century, encourage executives to identify with shareholders and
pursue short-term profit maximization.30 Instead of promoting the welfare of
workers and communities, for example,31 executives are socialized to maxi-
mize short-term profits and enhance the price of the stock.32 In effect, man-
agers are conditioned and pressured to run the business to advance the
interests of their wealthiest constituents: shareholders.33 While often taken as
a given, the promotion of shareholder interests over those of workers or the
public rests on questionable assumptions—and is historically new.34
At points in the past, managers may have felt sufficient pressure from
other segments of the firm, specifically workers, to share market power rents
more equitably. Indeed, in the unionized manufacturing sector in the mid-
twentieth century United States, the windfalls from market power appear to
have been divided with workers. The paradigmatic example is the “Treaty of
Detroit” arrangements that governed the U.S. auto industry (and heavy in-
dustry generally) during the decades following World War II.35 Although the
three giant carmakers earned significant oligopoly profits, they shared some
of the rents with their unionized workers through annual cost-of-living and
productivity raises and pensions negotiated under collective bargaining
agreements.36
Other sectors also followed this practice of sharing market power rents
with organized workers. Evidence from pre-deregulation airline and trucking
industries suggests that, in oligopolistic industries with high union density,
market power rents were, in part, disbursed to workers through higher com-
pensation.37 More generally, in concentrated industries characterized by oli-
gopoly power, unionized workers appeared to earn more than their non-
30 See generally Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial
Organization, 149 U. PENN. L. REV. 2063 (2001).
31 See MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL
CONTEXT, CORP. IMPACT 38–39 (2003).
32 Id.
33 Perhaps the most revealing—and troubling—illustration of this shareholder wealth
maximization norm is the stock buyback phenomenon. In recent years, many companies have,
instead of investing in their productive capacities, used surplus cash to buy back their stocks,
raise their stock prices, and enrich equity holders—including the executives who have received
stock options—in the process.  In stark terms, this buyback epidemic means that many execu-
tives sacrifice the long-term profitability and viability of the company to promote the short-
term interests of shareholders. See Karen Brettell et al., The Cannibalized Company, REUTERS
(Nov. 16, 2015, 2:30 PM), http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-buybacks-
cannibalized/ [https://perma.cc/C8JY-CGS2].
34 See WILLIAM LAZONICK, STOCK BUYBACKS: FROM RETAIN-AND-REINVEST TO DOWN-
SIZE-AND-DISTRIBUTE, BROOKINGS, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE PUB. MGMT. 12–14 (Apr. 2015) (ex-
plaining that workers and the government often make sizable and uncertain investments in
firms, contrary to the assumption that only shareholders do, and that shareholders typically do
not fund the productive investments of a firm).
35 Frank Levy & Peter Temin, Inequality and Institutions in 20th Century America 20–21
(NBER Working Paper No. 13106, May 2007), http://www.nber.org/papers/w13106.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PK3H-MENM].
36 Id. at 23–24.
37 See generally Nancy L. Rose, Labor Rent-Sharing and Regulation: Evidence from the
Trucking Industry, 95 J. POL. ECON. 1146 (1987); David Card, Deregulation and Labor Earn-
ings in the Airline Industry (NBER Working Paper No. 5687, July 1996).
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unionized counterparts, receiving a portion of the rents obtained by their
employers.38 The effects of unionization extended beyond particular organ-
ized firms and industries. The higher density of unions contributed to the
establishment norms of equity and to the securing of higher wages in non-
unionized sectors as well.39 On the whole, the power of organized labor
blunted the regressive economic effects of market power.
Given that labor today lacks effective countervailing power, market
power rents are not likely to be shared with workers in shareholder-centric
business sectors. In recent decades, labor’s countervailing power has been
more notable for its absence than its presence.40 Labor markets and work-
places have been radically transformed to the detriment of the working class,
with a qualitative shift from unionized, full-time jobs in manufacturing to
non-unionized, contingent jobs in the service sector.41 In 2015, only 6.7% of
private sector workers belonged to a union,42 compared to 25% in 1975.43 On
top of the decades-long decline of organized labor,44 the U.S. labor market
has been weak in recent years. Nearly eight years after the financial crisis,
the U.S. economy has not returned to full employment,45 undermining the
bargaining power of even those with jobs.46 In an economy in which workers
lack bargaining power and cannot demand higher wages, managers are un-
38 See generally Thomas Karier, Unions and Monopoly Profits, 67 REV. ECON. & STAT. 34
(1985); John E. Kwoka, Jr., Monopoly, Plant, and Union Effects on Worker Wages, 36 INDUS.
& LAB. REL. REV. 251 (1983).
39 See generally Bruce Western & Jake Rosenfeld, Unions, Norms, and the Rise in U.S.
Wage Inequality, 76 AM. SOC. REV. 513 (2011).
40 See Quoctrung Bui, 50 Years of Shrinking Union Membership, In One Map, NAT’L PUB-
LIC RADIO (Feb. 23, 2015, 11:04 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/money/2015/02/23/3858
43576/50-years-of-shrinking-union-membership-in-one-map [https://perma.cc/3TQE-HUWY]
(“Fifty years ago, nearly a third of U.S. workers belonged to a union. Today, it’s one in 10.”).
41 See generally GUY STANDING, THE PRECARIAT: THE NEW DANGEROUS CLASS (2011);
DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR SO MANY AND
WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT (2014).
42 Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members—2015 (Jan. 28, 2016), http:/
/www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5HR-C5LY].
43 Henry S. Farber, Union Membership in the United States: The Divergence Between the
Public and Private Sectors 27 (Princeton Univ., Working Paper No. 503, Sept. 2005), https://
core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6894934.pdf [https://perma.cc/PW7V-6YUC].
44 Another labor market development, the growth of independent contracting and franchis-
ing, has created a “fissured workplace” in which those who work together on a daily basis
may not be employed by the same entity or may have very different economic relationships
with the same employer. This fissuring of workplaces appears to have further eroded notions
of intra-firm wage equity and fairness and contributed to lower wages at the bottom of the pay
scale. WEIL, supra note 41, at 83–87.
45 Chico Harlan, An Unfruitful Jobs Recovery Rewrites the Definition of Full Employment,
WASH. POST (July 2, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/an-unfruitful-
jobs-recovery-rewrites-the-definition-of-full-employment/2015/07/02/1006e5c0-20ff-11e5-84
d5-eb37ee8eaa61_story.html [https://perma.cc/5M3J-KY2S].
46 Paul Krugman, The Populist Imperative, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.ny-
times.com/2014/01/24/opinion/krugman-the-populist-imperative.html [https://perma.cc/X27S-
5G58].
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likely to share the spoils from market power with their employees.47 Wage
trends support this hypothesis. Despite rising labor productivity, wages have
stagnated for most workers since the mid-1970s.48
The trend of increasing consolidation and rising market power coupled
with stagnant or declining wages suggests one possible way forward. A re-
vived union movement and realigned CEO incentives could help mitigate
the regressive effects of market concentration.49 With the exception of indus-
tries whose network effects or high fixed costs necessitate monopoly, how-
ever, market competition is still preferable to market concentration.
In contrast to shareholders and executives at businesses with market
power, consumers—the victims of market power—are much more likely to
be representative of society at large. While an affluent person is very likely
to spend more in absolute dollars on consumption than a person of lesser
means, the relationship between income and consumption is not one-to-one.
In other words, a person with an income fifty times greater than the median
income is unlikely to consume fifty times as much as the person earning the
median income. Rather, a person earning fifty thousand dollars per year al-
most certainly spends a larger fraction of his or her income on consumption
than a person earning one million dollars per year.50 More specifically, a less
affluent person is likely to spend a larger portion of his or her income on
essential goods—such as energy, food, and health care—than a wealthier
person.51 Monopoly and oligopoly overcharges are the functional equivalent
47 Even in unionized sectors defined by producer market power, corporations have been
reluctant to share the proceeds with workers. Verizon, whose unionized workers went on strike
in 2016, illustrates how the surplus of a corporation is disbursed today. The telecom undertook
a $5 billion stock buyback last year to boost its stock price, on top of an already
generous dividend. If that money had instead been divided among 180,000 workers,
it would have come to $28,000 per person—showing that there’s plenty of profit to
be shared across the company. Or, if it costs $500 to install FiOS in one household,
that money could have been used to help 10 million households cross the digital
divide.
Mike Konczal, How the Rise of Finance Has Warped Our Values, WASH. POST (Apr. 22, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2016/04/22/how-the-rise-of-finance-has-
warped-our-values/?utm_term=.674021859bc7 [https://perma.cc/7MCH-HYXF].
48 See Josh Bivens & Lawrence Mishel, Understanding the Historic Divergence Between
Productivity and a Typical Worker’s Pay: Why It Matters and Why It’s Real 3 (EPI, Briefing
Paper No. 406, Sept. 2015), http://www.epi.org/files/2015/understanding-productivity-pay-di-
vergence-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/72KG-VKSL] (“Net productivity grew 1.33 percent each
year between 1973 and 2014, faster than the meager 0.20 percent annual rise in median hourly
compensation. In essence, about fifteen percent of productivity growth between 1973 and 2014
translated into higher hourly wages and benefits for the typical American worker.”).
49 For a more comprehensive analysis of how a new labor law could help achieve greater
economic and political equality, see Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 1
(2016).
50 Saez & Zucman, supra note 15, at 30; Atif R. Mian et al., Household Balance Sheets,
Consumption, and the Economic Slump 26 (Chi. Booth, Research Paper No. 13-32, June
2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=1961211 [https://perma.cc/RE9Z-
LJKD].
51 See, e.g., PHILLIP R. KAUFMAN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ECON. REPORT NO. 759,
DO THE POOR PAY MORE FOR FOOD? ITEM SELECTION AND PRICE DIFFERENCES AFFECT LOW-
INCOME HOUSEHOLD FOOD COSTS iii (1997), https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/
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of a sales tax and, in the markets for necessities, are very likely to have
regressive effects, as most sales taxes do.52
The distributive effects of market power are understudied. In a 1975
study, William Comanor and Robert Smiley found that market power in the
U.S. economy had significant regressive wealth effects in the 1960s—a pe-
riod of much less economic inequality and greater economy-wide competi-
tion than the present.53 Their economic simulations of the U.S. economy in
196354 found that monopoly power transferred wealth to the most affluent
segment of society. Comparing the real-world economy in which firms in
many markets possess monopoly or oligopoly power with a theoretical econ-
omy in which all markets are competitive, Comanor and Smiley found that a
fully competitive economy would benefit the overwhelming majority of
Americans. Specifically, 93.3% of the population that had limited or no bus-
iness ownership interests would see an improvement in their relative wealth
position, thanks to lower prices for goods and services.55 In contrast, the
most affluent 2.4% of the population, which had total assets of greater than
one hundred thousand dollars in 1962, would see a decline in wealth of as
much as fifty percent.56 A recent study that performed an economic simula-
tion of the European Union found comparable progressive distributional ef-
fects from curbing market power.57
Given managerial norms that prize the interests of the generally affluent
shareholder class, the inability of workers to demand a share of market
power rents, and the higher fraction of income devoted to consumption by
working and middle class Americans, market power in most sectors can be
expected to redistribute wealth upwards. Oligopolistic and monopolistic
firms, by raising prices, capture wealth from consumers. In the case of
oligopsonists and monopsonists, these powerful buyers capture wealth from
small producers by depressing purchase prices for their output. The higher
prices borne by consumers (the ninety-nine percent as a rough shorthand)
translate into larger profits for firms and ultimately larger dividends and cap-
ital gains for shareholders and larger salaries and bonuses for executives—
two groups that tend to be overwhelmingly affluent (the one percent as
shorthand).
aer759/32372_aer759.pdf [https://perma.cc/44BF-PLST] (“[P]oor households spend a higher
proportion of their income on food than wealthier households which confirms a fundamental
principle of economics—the percentage of income spent on necessities falls as income
rises.”).
52 See, e.g., Sean Higgins et al., Comparing the Incidence of Taxes and Social Spending in
Brazil and the United States, 61 REV. INCOME & WEALTH (forthcoming 2016).
53
PIKETTY, supra note 1, at 24. R
54 William S. Comanor & Robert H. Smiley, Monopoly and the Distribution of Wealth, 89
Q.J. ECON. 177, 187 (1975).
55 Id. at 191.
56 Id.
57 Fabienne Ilzkovitz & Adriaan Dierx, Competition Policy and Inclusive Growth, VOXEU
(June 19, 2016), http://voxeu.org/article/competition-policy-and-inclusive-growth [https://per
ma.cc/9REP-E7MN].
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II. HOW LARGE BUSINESSES COLLUDE, MERGE, AND MONOPOLIZE
MARKETS AND EXTRACT INCOME FROM CONSUMERS
AND SMALL PRODUCERS
Trends in several major industries suggest that market power is a perva-
sive problem and an important contributor to economic inequality in the
United States.58 Businesses use a variety of methods—including collusion,
mergers, and exclusion—that are, at best, policed imperfectly, to extract
greater wealth from the public than would be possible were they subject to
stronger competitive forces.59 Case studies of anticompetitive behavior in six
key sectors of the economy shed light on how market power transfers in-
come and wealth in a generally upward direction. Consumers in a number of
markets pay more for everyday goods and services—and small suppliers in
some markets may receive less income—because of monopoly and oligop-
oly power. Given the distribution of capital ownership, power of top-level
managers, and powerlessness of workers, these elevated consumer prices
and depressed producer prices generally transfer income from the ordinary
many to the elite few.
TABLE 1: ESTIMATES OF SELLER-SIDE MARKET POWER RENTS IN SIX
SECTORS OF THE U.S. ECONOMY IN 2014
60
  Billions of Dollars of Market Power Rents 




(in billions) 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 
Hospitals $972 $49 $97 $146 $194 $243 
Pharmaceuticals $377 $19 $38 $57 $75 $94 
Food* $704 $35 $70 $106 $141 $176 
Telecommunications $229 $11 $23 $34 $46 $57 
Airlines $207 $10 $21 $31 $41 $52 
Electricity** $176 $9 $18 $26 $35 $44 
Total (in billions) $2,664 $133 $266 $400 $533 $666 
*Retail sales for food consumed at home. 
**Residential electricity sales only. 
58 Other important drivers of economic inequality in the United States appear to be the
reduced progressivity of the tax system, the growth of the financial sector, and the weakening
of organized labor. See generally ATKINSON, supra note 2. R
59 In fact, market power may be even more severe and pervasive than some statistics
suggest. Cross-ownership by financial institutions in competing firms means that conventional
measures of concentration understate market power in many markets. José Azar et al., Anti-
Competitive Effects of Common Ownership 37–38 (Ross Sch. of Bus., Paper No. 1235, 2016),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2427345 [https://perma.cc/CC9C-MS69].
60 Sources of industry revenue data:
Hospitals: National Health Expenditure Data, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.
(Aug. 10, 2016), https://www.cms.gov/research-statistics-data-and-systems/statistics-trends-
and-reports/nationalhealthexpenddata/nhe-fact-sheet.html [https://perma.cc/DL5W-NHAU].
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While these case studies do not purport to establish a firm causal rela-
tionship between market power and economic inequality, they point to a
connection between the two, particularly when viewed together with other
developments.61 For instance, the share of corporate profits as a percentage
of gross domestic product has risen alongside the rise in inequality, espe-
cially over the past fifteen years.62 More firms also appear to be earning rates
of return on their assets that are above competitive levels.63 Goldman Sachs
has even advised clients to invest in oligopolistic sectors as a means of en-
joying higher rates of return.64 In open, competitive markets, these high rates
of return would ordinarily spur business investment from incumbents and
new entrants. Rather than chasing these attractive returns, however, many
businesses are sitting on large reserves of idle cash.65
Pharmaceuticals: U.S. Pharma Market Will Top $377 Billion in 2014; Up 11–13%, PHARM.
COMMERCE (Nov. 20, 2014), http://pharmaceuticalcommerce.com/latest-news/us-pharma-
market-will-top-377-billion-in-2014-up-11-13/ [https://perma.cc/URS8-D8JT].
Food: Food Sales, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. (June 23, 2016), http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-
products/food-expenditures/food-expenditures/#Food%20Sales [https://perma.cc/6FQH-
8VDH].
Telecommunications: FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, UNIVERSAL SERVICE MONITORING REPORT
12 (2015), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-337019A1.pdf [https://perma
.cc/3GUU-LZ65].
Airlines: Operating Revenue (In Thousands of Dollars $000): All U.S. Carriers – All
Regions, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., http://www.transtats.bts.gov/Data_Elements_Financial.aspx?
Data=7 [https://perma.cc/R4H3-C98F].
Electricity: 2014 Total Electric Industry Revenue (Thousands Dollars), ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/electricity/sales_revenue_price/pdf/table3.pdf [https://perma.cc/
NG2Z-UTD4].
Connor and Lande reviewed 1,157 estimates of cartel overcharges and found the median
overcharge to be 23.3% and the mean overcharge to be 49%. Connor & Lande, supra note 11,
at 456. On the whole, monopolies and oligopolies face fewer coordination challenges than
cartels and thus exercise market power more ruthlessly. Even accounting for reduced sales
volume from higher prices, assuming market power rents in oligopolistic or monopolistic
markets to be 15 to 25% of revenues appears quite defensible. In more competitive segments
of an industry, market power rents (as a percentage of revenues) are likely to be lower. Market
power rents (as a percentage of total revenues) for an entire industry depend on, among other
things, the fraction of revenues derived from competitive rather than oligopolistic or
monopolistic segments.
61 See generally Paul Krugman, CHALLENGING THE OLIGARCHY, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Dec.
17, 2015), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2015/12/17/robert-reich-challenging-oligarchy/
[https://perma.cc/U6V2-FPKM] (discussing the relationship between market power and rising
inequality in a review of ROBERT B. REICH, SAVING CAPITALISM: FOR THE MANY, NOT THE
FEW (2015)).
62 Corporate Profits After Tax (Without IVA and CCAdj) / Gross Domestic Product, FED.
RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS, https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/graph/?g=cSh [https://per
ma.cc/ZX8C-HK4R].
63 Furman & Orszag, supra note 22, at 9–10.
64 Ryan Cooper, Even Goldman Sachs Thinks Monopolies Are Pillaging Consumers,
WEEK (June 30, 2016), http://theweek.com/articles/633101/even-goldman-sachs-thinks-mo-
nopolies-are-pillaging-american-consumers [https://perma.cc/8M4L-GLJF].
65 Eric Platt, Top 50 Boardroom Hoarders Sit on $1 Trillion in Cash, FIN. TIMES (May 10,
2015), https://www.ft.com/content/34d58a8a-f5a0-11e4-bc6d-00144feab7de.
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A. Health Care
Health care is one of the biggest sectors of the U.S. economy, making
up 17.5% of national gross domestic product in 2014.66 Consequently,
changes in consumer prices have significant distributive effects. Some have
argued that because health care spending is largely mediated through an in-
surance system, consumers are rarely the direct or even the ultimate payers
of health care costs.67 What this view misses, however, is that insurers fre-
quently pass on higher costs to consumers in the form of higher premiums
and higher deductibles. Individuals receiving their health insurance through
employer-based plans may experience price hikes in the form of lower
wages, assuming employers choose to pass on costs too. Rising concentra-
tion in local health insurance markets makes consumers even more likely to
bear higher healthcare costs. One study estimated that the increase in local
market concentration raised insurance premiums by about thirty-four billion
dollars per year, or about two hundred dollars per person with employer-
sponsored health insurance, between 1998 and 2007.68
1. Hospitals
Hospitals comprise one of the leading sub-industries in health care,
generating $923 billion in revenue in 2014.69 Two successive rounds of con-
solidation have transformed the hospital industry over the last few decades.
The first major merger wave began in the 1980s, when nearly two hundred
hospitals merged per year.70 By the mid-1990s, annual merger volume had
increased nine-fold.71 Market concentration increased accordingly: in 1990,
the average Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI, a widely used measure of
market concentration) in a metropolitan statistical area was 1,576 (consid-
ered “moderately concentrated”); by 2003, that figure had risen to 2,323
(close to the threshold for “highly concentrated”).72 Over this period, the
66 National Health Expenditure Data, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Aug. 10,
2016), https://www.cms.gov/research-statistics-data-and-systems/statistics-trends-and-reports/
nationalhealthexpenddata/nhe-fact-sheet.html [https://perma.cc/3FF5-M7BF].
67 See, e.g., Crane, supra note 8, at 31.
68 Leemore Dafny et al., Paying a Premium on Your Premium? Consolidation in the US
Health Insurance Industry, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 1161, 1163 (2012).
69 Revenue of Hospitals (NAICS 62211) in the United States from 2009 to 2014 (in Billion
U.S. Dollars), STATISTA (2016), http://www.statista.com/statistics/296845/revenue-hospitals-
in-the-us/ [https://perma.cc/GZ7X-CT3D].
70 The True Price of Reduced Competition in Health Care: Hospital Monopolies Drasti-
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number of competing local hospital systems available to the average Ameri-
can fell from six to four.73
This initial round of consolidation has been followed by a more recent
wave, particularly in the wake of the Affordable Care Act, which en-
couraged provider consolidation in the name of greater coordination of
health care delivery. Sixty-six mergers occurred in 2010; 488 have taken
place since then, with 112 in 2015 alone.74 Sixty percent of hospitals are now
part of larger health systems, an increase of seven percentage points from the
early 2000s.75 Nearly half of all hospital markets in the United States are
highly concentrated, one-third are moderately concentrated, and the remain-
ing one-sixth are unconcentrated. Meanwhile, under the HHI, no hospital
market is considered highly competitive.76
Research indicates that consolidation among hospitals has led to a sig-
nificant increase in health care prices. Studies assessing the effects of con-
solidation within the same geographic region in the 1990s found that prices
in these areas increased by forty percent or more.77 More recent work found
that the trend continues: price increases following hospital mergers in con-
centrated markets often exceed twenty percent.78 A separate summary of ex-
isting research cites eight studies that found price increases ranging from ten
to forty percent due to mergers.79
Hospital consolidation can raise consumer health prices in many ways,
including by increasing the bargaining power of hospitals in negotiations
with insurers. Having fewer hospital systems makes it costlier for a health
insurer to exclude even one system from its network. Given that each system
may cover a large part of the market, consumers and employers are less
likely to purchase a plan that does not provide patients access to a significant
fraction of the local hospital market. With greater leverage, each hospital
system can charge insurers a higher price—which insurers pass on to con-
sumers in the form of lower benefits and higher premiums, co-pays, and
deductibles.
A recent study of private health care spending analyzed data for thirty
percent of individuals with employer-sponsored coverage, encompassing
ninety-two billion health insurance claims from eighty-eight million people.
The authors found that the prices hospitals negotiate with health insurance
firms vary significantly both within and across geographic areas in the
73 Id.
74 Hospital Merger and Acquisition Activity Up Sharply in 2015, According to Kaufman
Hall Analysis, KAUFMANHALL, http://www.kaufmanhall.com/about/news/hospital-merger-and-
acquisition-activity-up-sharply-in-2015-according-to-kaufman-hall-analysis [https://perma.cc/
2EP7-NURD].
75 David M. Cutler & Fiona Scott Morton, Hospitals, Market Share, and Consolidation,
310 JAMA 1964, 1965 (2013).
76 Id. at 1966.
77 Id. at 1967–68.
78
MARTIN GAYNOR & ROBERT TOWN, THE IMPACT OF HOSPITAL CONSOLIDATION—UP-
DATE, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. 1 (2012), http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/re-
ports/issue_briefs/2012/rwjf73261 [https://perma.cc/UYR3-UYVZ].
79 Cutler & Scott Morton, supra note 75.
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United States. For example, 2011 hospital prices for certain treatments were
twelve times higher in the most expensive region in the country than in the
cheapest region, and could vary by up to a factor of nine even within a city.
Notably, the single primary driver of this difference across markets is com-
petition. Hospitals in monopoly markets, for example, have prices that are
fifteen percent higher than those in markets with four or more providers, the
study found, even after controlling for differences in cost and clinical qual-
ity. Hospitals in duopoly markets, meanwhile, charge prices that are 6.4%
higher, and markets with a hospital triopoly are 4.8% more expensive.80 The
authors estimate that the price of an average inpatient stay at a monopoly
hospital is almost $1,900 higher than where there are four or more competi-
tors. “We know that these higher prices end up getting translated into higher
premiums that employers pass on to workers,” one of the authors said in an
interview.81
Strikingly, the correlation between market consolidation and increased
prices holds across different forms of ownership. Nonprofit hospitals tradi-
tionally argue that mergers between them will not raise prices precisely be-
cause they are nonprofits. But data established that “prices are just as high in
nonprofit as in for-profit organizations,”82 even though the government sub-
sidizes nonprofits “to the tune of $30 billion dollars annually, in the form of
tax exemptions.”83
2. Pharmaceuticals
The pharmaceutical industry raises a number of competition issues.
These include well-known debates over the optimal level of patent protec-
tion, as well as two specific practices that will be our focus here: (1) exclu-
sion payments by branded drug makers to prospective generic rivals and (2)
product hopping by branded drug makers. Both practices delay generic drug
80 See Zack Cooper et al., The Price Ain’t Right? Hospital Prices and Health Spending on
the Privately Insured 3 (NBER, Working Paper No. 21815, Dec. 2015), http://www.nber.org/
papers/w21815.pdf [https://perma.cc/993D-9ZYH].
81 Mike Cummings, Hospital Prices Show “Mind-Boggling” Variation Across U.S. Driv-
ing Up Health Care Costs, YALE NEWS (Dec. 2015), http://news.yale.edu/2015/12/15/hospital-
prices-show-mind-boggling-variation-across-us-driving-health-care-costs [https://perma.cc/
TY9C-3VDF].
82 Cutler & Scott Morton, supra note 75, at 1967 (citation omitted); see also Emmett B.
Keeler et al., The Changing Effects of Competition on Non-Profit and For-Profit Hospital
Pricing Behavior, 18 J. HEALTH ECON. 69, 81–82 (1999); Cooper et al., supra note 80;
Michael G. Vita & Seth Sacher, The Competitive Effects of Not-for-Profit Hospital Mergers: A
Case Study, FED. TRADE COMM’N 31, https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/
competitive-effects-not-profit-hospital-mergers-case-study/hospitals.pdf [https://perma.cc/
NHH2-27DF] (“These price increases—and in particular, the price increase at Watsonville
hospital, a locally-sponsored and administered community hospital—suggest strongly that
mergers involving not-for-profit hospitals are a legitimate focus of antitrust concern.”).
83 See The True Price of Reduced Competition in Health Care: Hospital Monopolies Dras-
tically Drive Up Prices, PROMARKET (Mar. 14, 2016), https://promarket.org/the-true-price-of-
reduced-competition-in-health-care-hospital-monopolies-drastically-drive-up-prices [https://
perma.cc/R354-84S7].
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competition and cost consumers billions of dollars more per year in pharma-
ceutical expenditures.
Exclusion payments between branded and generic drug manufacturers
have received significant antitrust scrutiny in recent years.84 Under the regu-
latory scheme established by the Hatch-Waxman Act, a generic drug maker
can enter the market and compete against a patented drug maker with a bioe-
quivalent drug and without performing full clinical trials ordinarily required
for a new drug. To qualify for this path to the market, the generic company
must show that either the patents covering the branded drug are invalid or
the generic drug does not infringe these patents.85 The incumbent branded
drug maker has the opportunity to prevent generic entry by filing a patent
infringement suit.86 The Hatch-Waxman regime offers a faster path to entry
for generic drugs and is intended to promote greater competition in the phar-
maceutical market.
Over the past two decades, however, branded drug makers have used
the system to frustrate generic competition. Soon after a generic company
has announced its intention of entering a market under the auspices of
Hatch-Waxman, branded drug manufacturers have filed lawsuits alleging
patent infringement by the prospective generic entrant.87 This act alone is not
necessarily either anticompetitive or contrary to the purpose of Hatch-Wax-
man. However, instead of litigating the case or reaching a settlement in
which the branded manufacturers receive compensation from the alleged
patent infringers, branded drug manufacturers pay the generic company on
the condition that the generic company postpone its planned market entry.88
On its face, this conduct is suspicious, as the branded company with a pat-
ented product is paying the alleged infringer; the owner of a legal entitle-
ment is paying someone else not to violate it.89 This conduct appears to be
market allocation, with the branded drug company paying the generic rival
not to compete.90
84 See, e.g., FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2233 (2013).
85 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2015).
86 Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
87 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST




88 See STAFF OF THE BUREAU OF COMPETITION, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND MOD-
ERNIZATION ACT OF 2003: OVERVIEW OF AGREEMENTS FILED IN FY 2013, at 4 (2014), https://
www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/agreements-filled-federal-trade-commission-
under-medicare-prescription-drug-improvement/141222mmafy13rpt-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/
QL77-CHHA] (providing number of settlements in each year between 2004 and 2013 in
which branded company paid generic entrant to resolve litigation).
89 See Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for Pre-
sumptive Illegality, 108 MICH. L. REV. 37, 68 (2009).
90 See Susan Schipper, Bad Medicine: FTC v. Actavis, Inc. and the Missed Opportunity to
Resolve the Pay-for-Delay Problem, 73 MD. L. REV. 1240, 1262 (2014).
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These arrangements are lucrative for both the branded and generic drug
companies—and costly for consumers. The attraction for the branded drug
company is apparent: monopoly profits, even when diminished by the
amount of the exclusion payment, remain higher than the competitive profits
the branded drug company would otherwise make.91 A generic drug can sell
for as much as ninety percent less than the branded drug.92 For the generic
company, the exclusion payment—a share of the branded drug company’s
monopoly profits—is almost certainly greater than the profits it would make
in a competitive market.93 In other words, the branded and generic drug com-
panies agree to share monopoly profits instead of competing them away and
ending up collectively worse off. These monopoly rents come out of the
pockets of consumers who bear the higher prices for essential drugs. In the
case of widely used medicines, an exclusion payment can transfer billions of
dollars per year from consumers into the pockets of pharmaceutical compa-
nies.94 One scholar estimated that in 2005, settlements that had the appear-
ance of anticompetitive purpose cost consumers approximately fourteen
billion dollars.95
Another anticompetitive practice, arguably even more costly to con-
sumers than exclusion payments,96 is “product hopping” by branded drug
companies. In a product hopping strategy, branded drug manufacturers make
minor tweaks to the existing branded drug to obtain a new patent and extend
their monopoly position. Under state generic substitution laws, pharmacists
are allowed or required to fill a prescription with an available generic
equivalent, unless the doctor or patient expressly requests the branded ver-
sion in the prescription.97 Because generic competition can reduce prices
substantially,98 branded drug manufacturers have powerful incentives to take
measures to perpetuate patent protection in the years leading up to the expi-
ration of the patent.
Product hopping can foreclose generic entry for a significant period of
time. The tweaks made to the existing drug often have negligible clinical
benefits for patients and include changing a drug delivery form to a capsule
from a pill (or vice-versa), combining two drugs that had been marketed
91 See C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regu-
latory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1553, 1580–81 (2006).
92
FTC PAY-FOR-DELAY STUDY, supra note 87. R
93 Hemphill, supra note 91, at 1581. R
94
FTC PAY-FOR-DELAY STUDY, supra note 87, at 2. R
95 See C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and
Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 649 (2009).
96 For now, government action appears to have diminished the prevalence of exclusion
payments. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Pay-for-Delay Deals Decreased Substan-
tially in the First Year Since Supreme Court’s Actavis Decision (Jan. 13, 2016), https://www.ftc
.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/01/ftc-report-drug-patent-settlements-shows-potential-
pay-delay [https://perma.cc/BR39-6LMN].
97 See Garth Boehm et al., Development of the Generic Drug Industry in the U.S. After the
Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984, 3 ACTA PHARMACEUTICA SINICA B 297, 298 (2013).
98 See FTC PAY-FOR-DELAY STUDY, supra note 87, at 1.
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separately, and slightly modifying the drug molecule.99 Once they develop
the new formulation or delivery mechanism, pharmaceutical companies
heavily market the new version to doctors and seek to persuade them to
prescribe it instead of the previous version that is about to go off patent.100
Given the large amounts of money branded companies devote to mar-
keting efforts,101 these efforts at “switching the market” to the new version
are likely to be successful.102 If the branded drug company executes the
switch successfully, doctors, who do not bear the price of more expensive
drugs,103 start prescribing the new drug in place of the old.104 Generic drug
makers cannot offer an unbranded version of the new patented drug, which
means that state generic substation laws cannot play their competition-en-
hancing purpose. The result is that the branded drug company maintains its
monopoly.105 To ensure that the product hop is successful, some branded
drug makers have even withdrawn the old version from the market to de-
prive doctors of the option of comparing the clinical effectiveness of the old
and new versions and prescribing the old out of consideration for the pa-
tient’s out-of-pocket expenses.106
This product hopping costs consumers billions of dollars annually. One
analysis, using conservative assumptions, estimated that product hopping
costs consumers more than twenty billion dollars a year.107 As an example,
insulin, essential for diabetics, appears to be persistently expensive because
of a series of product hops by branded manufacturers that have limited ge-
neric competition.108 Even when a product change has non-trivial benefits for
patients, this product improvement has to be weighed against the high cost
of monopolistic overcharges that third-party payers and ultimately consum-
ers have to bear.109 And importantly, in many actual instances of product
99 See Michael A. Carrier, A Real-World Analysis of Pharmaceutical Settlements: The
Missing Dimension of Product Hopping, 62 FL. L. REV. 1009, 1016–17 (2010) [hereinafter
Carrier I].
100 See Steve D. Shadowen et al., Anticompetitive Product Changes in the Pharmaceutical
Industry, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 45–46 (2009).
101 See Troyen A. Brennan et al., Health Industry Practices That Create Conflicts of Inter-
est: A Policy Proposal for Academic Medical Centers, 295 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 429, 430
(2006).
102 Empirical research has found that payments from drug manufacturers to doctors do
influence doctors’ prescribing practices. See Charles Ornstein et al., Now There’s Proof: Docs
Who Get Company Cash Tend to Prescribe More Brand-Name Meds, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 17,
2016, 5:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/doctors-who-take-company-cash-tend-to-
prescribe-more-brand-name-drugs [https://perma.cc/HP66-SDDN].
103 See Shadowen et al., supra note 100, at 11–13.
104 Cf. Michael A. Carrier, Provigil: A Case Study of Anticompetitive Behavior, 3 HAS-
TINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 441, 447–48 (2011) [hereinafter Carrier II] (describing why this
process happens in this way).
105 See Carrier I, supra note 99, at 1018.
106 See Shadowen et al., supra note 100, at 56–57.
107 See id. at 42.
108 See Kasia Lipska, Opinion, Break Up the Insulin Racket, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/21/opinion/sunday/break-up-the-insulin-racket.html [https://
perma.cc/QK7G-VV6D].
109 See Jonathan Jacobson et al., Predatory Innovation: An Analysis of Allied Orthopedic
v. Tyco in the Context of Section 2 Jurisprudence, 23 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2010).
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hopping, the new iteration of the drug appears to offer no tangible clinical
benefits over the existing version.110
B. Agriculture and Food Retail
After decades of mergers, the food retail and agricultural inputs and
processing sectors have become highly concentrated. The industry today is
shaped like an hourglass: millions of consumers and farmers on either end,
connected through a few large companies. Retail consolidation has enabled
firms to squeeze their suppliers for greater margins—spurring consolidation
along the supply chain—and led to worse outcomes for consumers. Research
suggests this level of consolidation has redistributive effects, transferring
wealth from both farmers and consumers to processors, distributors, and re-
tailers in the middle.
In retail, the top four grocers—Walmart, Kroger, Costco, and Safeway
—control more than half of all grocery sales.111 Concentration can be even
higher at the local level: in over twenty-nine metropolitan markets, Walmart
captures more than fifty percent of all grocery sales.112 Meanwhile, consoli-
dation shows no signs of slowing;113 the last few years have seen major
mergers between Kroger and Harris Teeter, Albertsons and Safeway,114 and
Ahold and Delhaize (which operate a suite of East Coast grocers, including
Giant, Stop & Shop, and Food Lion).115
110 See, e.g., Carrier I, supra note 99, at 1017 (“[T]he makers of the antidepressant Prozac
and the cholesterol treatment TriCor switched from capsule to tablet form, while anxiety-treat-
ing Buspar switched from tablet to capsule.”).
111 Market Share of the Leading Grocery Retailers in the United States in 2014, STATISTA
RESEARCH & ANALYSIS, http://www.statista.com/statistics/240481/food-market-share-of-the-
leading-food-retailers-of-north-america/.
112 Stacy Mitchell, Eaters Beware: Walmart Is Taking over Our Food System, GRIST (Dec.
30, 2011), http://grist.org/food/2011-12-30-eaters-beware-walmart-is-taking-over-our-food-
system/ [https://perma.cc/L76Y-MV6X]. This number has not been updated to reflect
Walmart’s market share since announced it would be shuttering several Express Stores and
SuperCenters.
113 As an industry analyst recently wrote, “The food retail industry is simultaneously con-
solidating and differentiating. We’re seeing fewer companies and more store concepts. The
mindset winning today is that you need to ‘get big or get niche’ to capture more of the mar-
ket.” Mark Dunson, Five Emerging Trends for Supermarket Retailers to Leverage in 2016,
CHAIN STORE AGE (Nov. 30, 2015), http://www.chainstoreage.com/article/five-emerging-
trends-supermarket-retailers-leverage-01 [https://perma.cc/H245-BRCT].
114 The level of consolidation resulting from this merger will be greater than what govern-
ment had planned and approved. Last year the FTC required Albertsons and Safeway to sell
off hundreds of stores as part of their merger. Months after the sale, however, one of the major
buyers of their stores declared bankruptcy and put the acquired stores back up for sale. Albert-
sons has bought back twelve of those stores—at a price far lower than what it had originally
paid. See Emily Parkhurst, Albertsons Buys Haggen, Will Continue to Operate 15 Stores
Under Haggen Brand, PUGET SOUND BUS. J. (Mar. 14, 2016), http://www.bizjournals.com/
seattle/news/2016/03/14/albertsons-buys-haggen-will-continue-to-operate-15.html.
115 Alexandra Biesada, Albertsons Files IPO amid Consolidation in Grocery Industry,
BIZMOLOGY (July 9, 2015), http://bizmology.hoovers.com/albertsons-files-ipo-amid-consoli-
dation-in-grocery-industry [https://perma.cc/47VY-4KAD].
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Concentration in the grocery sector is a relatively new phenomenon:
through the 1980s, the industry was largely decentralized and most Ameri-
cans purchased food from a variety of regional and local supermarket chains.
A wave of grocery mergers and buyouts in the 1990s, coupled with entry by
warehouse clubs and discount general merchandise stores into grocery prod-
ucts, reshaped the landscape. Grocers sought to bulk up in order to compete
with the scale of warehouse clubs and large discount stores, fueling further
mergers and leading many local grocers to close; there were 385 grocery
mergers between 1996 and 1999 alone.116 The share of groceries sold by the
four biggest food retailers more than doubled between 1997 and 2009, from
seventeen percent in 1994 to twenty-eight percent in 1999 and thirty-four
percent in 2004.117
While grocers often tout efficiencies as a benefit of mergers, little evi-
dence suggests that consumers have actually witnessed lower prices. Instead,
concentration seems to have resulted in higher prices.118 Several academic
studies have found a link between higher levels of local retail concentration
and higher grocery prices.119 A majority of studies reviewed by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA) in 2003 found that higher concentration
in grocery store markets contributes to higher consumer food prices.120 Ac-
cording to the American Antitrust Institute, concentration across the food
supply chain has “undoubtedly contributed to the increased cost of food.”121
In addition to raising prices for consumers, consolidation in the food
and agriculture sector has facilitated a significant wealth transfer from farm-
ers to food processors and meat packers. A handful of firms today control
the processing sector. The top four processors nationally control eighty per-
cent of beef, sixty percent of hog, and fifty percent of poultry.122 Powerful
players in commodities have expanded both horizontally and vertically;
ADM, Bunge, Cargill, and Dreyfus—the “big four”—control “as much as
90 per cent of the global grain trade.”123 On the processor side, firms have
116 Consolidation and Buyer Power in the Grocery Industry, FOOD & WATER WATCH 1
(Dec. 2010), https://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/sites/default/files/consolidation_buyer_pow
er_grocery_fs_dec_2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/P3TW-N2EM].
117 Tom Vilsack, U.S. Sec’y of Agric., Comments at Workshop on Agriculture and Anti-
trust Enforcement Issues in Our 21st Century Economy 7 (Dec. 8, 2010), https://www.justice
.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2011/02/22/dc-agworkshop-transcript.pdf [https://perma.cc/
JU3Y-Q7Z3].
118 But cf. David E. Davis, Prices, Promotions, and Supermarket Mergers, J. FOOD &
AGRIC. INDUS. ORG., Jan. 2010, at 1.
119 See, e.g., Ronald W. Cotterill, Antitrust Analysis of Supermarket Retailing: Common
Global Concerns that Play Out in Local Markets 6–7 (Food Mkt. Policy Ctr. ed., July 2005).
120 Richard Sexton et al., Grocery Retailer Behavior in the Procurement and Sale of Per-
ishable Fresh Produce Commodities, USDA-ERS CONTRACTORS & COOPERATORS REP NO. 2.,
at 3 (Sept. 2003).
121
AM. ANTITRUST INST., TRANSITION REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 281 (2008).
122 Table 2: Comparison of 1999 and 2011 data of CR 4 (on file with Harvard Law
Library).
123
SOPHIA MURPHY ET AL., CEREAL SECRETS 3 (Oxfam ed., 2012), https://www.oxfam
.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/rr-cereal-secrets-grain-traders-agriculture-30082012-en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2XP3-S243].
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both horizontally consolidated and vertically integrated, upending the struc-
ture of the industry for farmers and rendering them captive to a handful of
buyers. As with grocery stores, concentration at the local level can be even
more severe; many local markets are monopolized by a single firm, render-
ing farmers captive to the one entity. Farmers are also squeezed by powerful
players when they purchase inputs. In the seed industry, six hundred inde-
pendent companies in 1996 have whittled down today to six giants,124 which
now control sixty-three percent of the global seed market.125
The effects of horizontal consolidation are exacerbated by the fact that
the dominant and other leading firms in some of these sectors have also
vertically integrated. In the chicken industry, for example, a processing com-
pany delivers birds to farmers, who feed and grow them, and the firm then
collects them to take to market.126 The monopsony power held by these
processors enables them to require farmers to bear the risks of business—
including steep investments in farming equipment—and also to reduce the
prices paid for farmers’ products.127
Academic research has found that the farmer’s share of the retail dollar
of food has been dramatically decreasing, while consumers pay largely the
same or slightly higher prices. What has changed is that the middlemen that
dominate these sectors—Cargill, Monsanto, Tyson, JBS—are reaping much
higher returns, effecting a wealth transfer from farmers to these firms.
C. Telecommunications
Telecommunication services are central to the lives of most Americans.
It is estimated that in 2015 the average U.S. household spent around three
thousand dollars accessing services such as mobile voice, mobile data, cable,
landline voice, and broadband Internet.128 Consumers spent approximately
forty-one percent of this on mobile service (for voice and data), and over
thirty-seven percent of U.S. households have between four and eight con-
nected devices—a number that is expected to rise.129 In sum, telecommuni-
cations services comprise a significant and growing part of the consumer
economy.
Historically, the telecom sector—both wireline and wireless service—
has been highly concentrated. In 1984, under a court-approved settlement in
124 Guy Chazan & Lindsay Whipp, Farmers Sound Alarm Over Mega Deals, FIN. TIMES
(Sept. 6, 2016), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c815119c-6f4f-11e6-9ac1-1055824ca907.html#axz
z4JtDb914H.
125 Id.
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a long-running monopolization suit, AT&T divested its local phone opera-
tions and created seven “Baby Bells.” The aim was to isolate the monopolis-
tic local phone segment and establish the conditions for competition in the
long-distance and equipment markets.
Following the 1996 Telecommunications Act—which lifted ownership
caps and deregulated rates—companies across sub-sectors linked up. The
old AT&T, meanwhile, had for years been seeking to enter local markets,
but exclusionary tactics by the Baby Bells kept the firm out.130 In 2005,
AT&T gave up and merged with SBC, while Verizon bought up MCI.131
Long-distance and local phone service—which the government had sought
to separate in 1984—had once again been coupled, and the United States
was left with two major phone companies, AT&T and Verizon. The sector
remains highly concentrated today: in mobile subscriptions, the top four
firms—AT&T, Verizon, Sprint, and T-Mobile—control roughly ninety-eight
percent of the market; the top two alone control around sixty-eight
percent.132
Over the last few years, evidence has emerged that these firms are not
competing to improve service. During AT&T’s proposed bid to buy up T-
Mobile, the public learned that AT&T was “sitting on large swaths of un-
derutilized spectrum and maintaining legacy networks rather than investing
in upgrades that would substantially increase capacity”—signaling that it
was not facing competitive pressures.133
More generally, these firms have responded to increased demand not by
expanding capacity but by hiking prices and degrading service—primarily
through introducing data caps and tiered pricing. In 2010, AT&T eliminated
its unlimited data plan for new users;134 Verizon followed shortly after by
introducing tiered pricing. Since then, AT&T has gone on to “throttle” cus-
tomers with existing unlimited coverage, slowing down their service once
they hit certain usage amounts, even when there was no congestion.135 As
noted by analysts and reporters, the company has used throttling to coax
customers to switch to pricier plans with limited service. AT&T drew a one
hundred million dollar fine from the Federal Communications Commission
130 See SUSAN CRAWFORD, CAPTIVE AUDIENCE 50 (2013).
131 Id.
132 Market Share of Wireless Subscriptions Held by Carriers in the U.S. from 1st Quarter
2011 to 3rd Quarter 2016, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/199359/market-share-
of-wireless-carriers-in-the-us-by-subscriptions/ [https://perma.cc/E25J-NT6Y].
133 Hibah Hussain et al., Capping the Nation’s Broadband Future, NEW AMERICA 10 (Dec.
17, 2012), https://www.newamerica.org/oti/policy-papers/capping-the-nations-broadband-fu-
ture/ [https://perma.cc/TAN8-2ZYK].
134 AT&T has recently re-introduced an “unlimited” data plan that maxes out at three
hundred GBP. See Press Release, AT&T, AT&T Introduces New Unlimited Plan for AT&T
Wireless and DIRECTV Subscribers (Jan. 11, 2016), http://about.att.com/story/unlimited_plan
_for_wireless_and_directv_subscribers.html [https://perma.cc/VKG9-TGXP].
135 Jon Brodkin, AT&T Still Throttles “Unlimited Data”—Even When Network Not Con-
gested, ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 4, 2014), http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2014/12/
att-still-throttles-unlimited-data-even-when-network-not-congested/ [https://perma.cc/5YEP-L
8VH].
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and a lawsuit from the Federal Trade Commission for deceptively marketing
these plans subject to throttling as “unlimited.”136 Looking at wireless
broadly, analysts estimate that between fifty to seventy percent of Americans
overpay for their mobile-phone plans, paying double what they would in a
more competitive market.137
Research suggests that Verizon and AT&T’s choice to introduce data
caps and tiered pricing is an exercise of market power. Rapid technological
advancement over the last few years has led the costs of providing service to
decline, even as consumer demand for data has increased. As one study
observes:
Though mobile providers may need to utilize some usage limita-
tions on their network given greater capacity constraints as com-
pared to wired broadband, the use of flat monthly caps makes little
sense when congestion on the network is likely to be time and
geographically limited. Instead, the decision by AT&T Wireless
and Verizon Wireless to move users onto tiered plans and the cur-
rent price levels are largely influenced by Wall Street demands to
report ever-growing revenue and profit margins. Rather than effec-
tively managing use of the network, data caps are a strategy for
ISPs to increase their revenue per user.138
Partly as a result, Americans are allocating a greater share of their
monthly budget to pay for wireless service. Consumer spending for mobile
service has increased since 2008, even while families have cut back in other
sectors—a fact that wireless carriers are using to bet they can hike prices
even higher.139 Profits at wireless firms remain high: AT&T made $6.7 bil-
lion in net income in 2014 and $13.7 billion in 2015,140 while Verizon gener-
ated $9.6 billion and $17.9 billion, respectively.141 AT&T returned more than
136 Jon Brodkin, AT&T Urges Unlimited Data Customers to Give Up Plans, Raises Price
by $5, ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 1, 2015), http://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2015/12/att-urges-unlim-
ited-data-customers-to-give-up-plans-raises-price-by-5/ [https://perma.cc/BPP8-V8MW].
137 Olga Kharif & Scott Mortiz, You’re Probably Paying Too Much for Your Mobile-Phone
Service, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 11, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-11/
you-re-probably-paying-too-much-for-your-mobile-phone-service [https://perma.cc/XEH7-29
EP].
138 Hussain et al., supra note 133, at 3.
139 Anton Troianovski, Cellphones Are Eating the Family Budget, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 28,
2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390444083304578018731890309450
(“Wireless carriers are betting they can pull bills even higher by offering faster speeds on
expensive new networks and new usage-based data plans. The effort will test the limits of
consumer spending as the draw of new technology competes with cellphone owners’ more
rudimentary needs and desires.”).
140 AT&T Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K, Exhibit 13) (Feb. 18, 2016), https://www.sec
.gov/Archives/edgar/data/732717/000073271716000147/ex13.htm [https://perma.cc/7M3C-9P
7E].
141 Verizon Commc’ns Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K, Exhibit 13) (Feb. 23, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/732712/000119312516473367/d35513dex13.htm
[https://perma.cc/K5CT-ARUV].
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$11 billion to shareholders in 2014,142 while Verizon returned $7.8 billion in
dividends.143
A similar story is true in the cable sector. Two firms—Comcast and
Time Warner—control more than two-thirds of the national broadband mar-
ket. Sixty-one percent of Americans live in markets with no competition,
meaning they have access to, at most, one high-speed broadband provider.144
Despite a substantial decrease in the cost of operating a network and trans-
porting data, consumers have not seen a subsequent decline in the cost of
service. Instead, broadband companies have further raised prices and also
imposed data caps.145 Since their reports to investors show sharply declining
costs for IP transit as a percentage of revenue, this is leading to higher net
profits.146
At the same time, quality has not kept up. Studies show that U.S. con-
sumers pay more for slower Internet speeds than consumers in other coun-
tries. For example, providers in Seoul, Hong Kong, and Tokyo offer one
gigabit per second plans for under forty dollars; in major U.S. cities, the
fastest speed available is five hundred Mbps and costs around three hundred
dollars a month.147
Although regulators managed to block the proposed Comcast-Time
Warner deal—which would have handed a single firm more than half the
country’s high-speed Internet and one-third of the cable television mar-
ket148—a suite of proposed deals since then show that the oligopolistic prov-
iders seek to consolidate further. In July 2015, the Justice Department149 and
Federal Communications Commission150 permitted AT&T’s forty-eight bil-
lion dollar acquisition of DirecTV to proceed. Another large merger was
142 Press Release, AT&T, AT&T Reports Strong Subscriber Gains and Solid Revenue
Growth in Fourth Quarter (Jan. 27, 2015), http://about.att.com/story/att_fourth_quarter_earn-
ings_2014.html [https://perma.cc/S7Z3-L2RW].
143 Letter from Lowell McAdam, Chairman & Chief Exec. Officer, Verizon Commc’ns
Inc., to Verizon Commc’ns Inc. Shareowners (2014), http://www.verizon.com/about/sites/de-
fault/files/annual/chairmans-letter-2014.html [https://perma.cc/Z8BE-P8GZ].
144
FEDERAL COMMC’NS COMM’N, 2016 BROADBAND PROGRESS REPORT ¶ 86 (2016),
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-16-6A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/4UMT-6LF
W].
145 Hussain et al., supra note 133, at 6–7.
146 Id. at 6.
147 Danielle Kehl et al., The Cost of Connectivity, NEW AMERICA (Oct. 30, 2014), https://
www.newamerica.org/oti/new-report-the-cost-of-connectivity-2014/ [https://perma.cc/3KTT-
RD4E].
148 Brian Fung, The Latest Time Warner Cable Merger Isn’t Comcast All Over Again,
Execs Argue, WASH. POST (May 26, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/
wp/2015/05/26/the-latest-time-warner-cable-merger-isnt-comcast-all-over-again-execs-argue/
[https://perma.cc/9MFY-LAAD].
149 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, Just. Dep’t Will Not Challenge
AT&T’s Acquisition of DirecTV (July 21, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-de-
partment-will-not-challenge-atts-acquisition-directv [https://perma.cc/4SSQ-5VXV].
150
FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, FCC ORDER APPROVING AT&T-DIRECTV TRANSACTION
(July 28, 2015), https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-releases-order-approving-att-directv-
transaction.
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recently allowed to proceed: Charter’s bid to acquire Time Warner Cable.151
Shortly after, Time Warner proceeded to raise its Internet and television rates
for New York customers.152
D. Industries Historically Subject to Price Regulation
1. Airlines
Since the deregulation of entry and prices in the airline industry in
1978, the sector has been characterized by boom-and-bust cycles.153 Airlines
collectively lost nearly sixty billion dollars between 1978 and 2009.154 While
this fact might suggest that the restructured industry has been competitive,
the sector is, in fact, dominated by firms that wield market power—the re-
sult of a wave of mergers and exclusionary practices by dominant hub carri-
ers. Looking both nationwide and at major hub airports, a defining feature of
the industry today is extremely high concentration.
Over the past ten years, the number of major carriers has declined from
nine to four, with a handful of smaller competitors existing on the fringes.155
This concentrated market structure is the culmination of merger activity that
took off a few years after deregulation in 1978.156 While vigorous entry has
occurred at times over the past forty years, nearly all entrants were either
liquidated or absorbed by a rival.157 Mergers have eliminated previous head-
to-head competition on a number of routes.158 In the latest merger wave,
Delta purchased Northwest in 2008, United acquired Continental in 2010,
Southwest bought AirTran in 2011, and American combined with US Air-
ways in 2014.159 Nearly ninety percent of city-pair markets are highly
151
FEDERAL COMM’CNS COMM’N, COMMISSION APPROVES CHARTER, TWC AND BRIGHT
MERGER OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS (May 10, 2016), https://www.fcc.gov/document/commis-
sion-approves-charter-twc-and-bright-house-merger.
152 Larry Rulison, Time Warner Cable Raises TV and Internet Rates Once Again, ALBANY
TIMES UNION (Jan. 18, 2016), http://blog.timesunion.com/business/after-ny-oks-merger-time-
warner-cable-raising-rates/72121/ [https://perma.cc/U3Q7-GZ46].
153 See Severin Borenstein, On the Persistent Financial Losses of U.S. Airlines: A Prelimi-
nary Exploration 2, (NBER Working Paper No. 16,744, Jan. 2011), http://www.nber.org/pa-
pers/w16744.pdf [https://perma.cc/GB6W-N2X9] (“[I]n 2009 dollars, domestic passenger
airline operations lost $10 billion from 1979 to 1989, made profits of $5 billion in the 1990s
and lost $54 billion from 2000 to 2009.”).
154 Id.
155 Kerry Close, Travel Groups Want Congress to Investigate Airline Competition (or Lack
Thereof), TIME (Feb. 2, 2016), http://time.com/money/4204413/airline-competition-congress/
?iid=sr-link1 [https://perma.cc/RYX5-Z5Y7].
156 Severin Borenstein & Nancy L. Rose, How Airlines Market Work . . . Or Do They?
Regulatory Reform in the Airline Industry 20 (NBER Working Paper No. 13,452, Sep. 2013),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w13452.pdf [https://perma.cc/P7AF-RGLG].
157 Id. at 18.
158 Scott McCartney, Where Airfares Are Taking Off, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 10, 2013), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324010704578414813368268482.
159 Christopher Drew, Airlines Under Justice Dept. Investigation Over Possible Collusion,
N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/02/business/airlines-under-jus-
tice-dept-investigation-over-possible-collusion.html [https://perma.cc/MJ6M-FS9B].
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concentrated.160
The effects of this concentrated market structure are clear. With just
four major players in the market, the incentives to compete have been signif-
icantly diminished. A market structure conducive to coordinated pricing ap-
pears to have emerged.161 The big four carriers face each other in a number
of markets and have little reason to undercut current fares and sabotage col-
lective profits.162 Airlines indeed appear to follow each other in imposing
new fees on fliers, an indication of tacit collusion.163 Pricing “discipline” (at
the expense of consumers) is now the watchword among airline
executives.164
Despite the dramatic decline in fuel prices (one of the most important
inputs in air travel) over the past two years, airfares have remained largely
constant and even increased on some routes.165 In 2015, the average airfare
hit a twelve-year high, accounting for inflation.166 After a decade of massive
losses following the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent de-
cline in demand for air travel,167 the industry has posted strong profits over
the past two years.168 American Airlines alone made $7.6 billion in 2015.169
Warren Buffett, who previously vowed not to invest in airlines again after
losing money in the industry in the 1990s, has acquired stakes in all four
major carriers, reflecting a belief that bountiful profits are here to stay.170
160
FIONA SCOTT MORTON ET AL., CHARLES RIVER ASSOCIATES, BENEFITS OF PRESERVING
CONSUMERS’ ABILITY TO COMPARE AIRLINE FARES 35–36 (2015), http://www.traveltech.org/
wp-content/uploads/2015/05/CRA.TravelTech.Study_.pdf [https://perma.cc/73RM-Z9KH].
161 David McLaughlin & Mary Schlangenstein, U.S. Looks at Airline Investors for Evi-
dence of Fare Collusion, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 22, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti-
cles/2015-09-22/do-airfares-rise-when-carriers-have-same-investors-u-s-asks [https://perma
.cc/M594-9YT5].
162 See generally Federico Ciliberto & Jonathan W. Williams, Does Multimarket Contact
Facilitate Tacit Collusion? Inference on Conduct Parameters in the Airline Industry, 45 RAND
J. ECON. 764 (2014).
163 Tim Wu, Enough with the Crazy Change Fees, NEW YORKER (July 21, 2015), http://
www.newyorker.com/business/currency/enough-with-the-crazy-change-fees [https://perma.cc/
97KB-L698].
164 James B. Stewart, “Discipline” for Airlines, Pain for Fliers, N.Y. TIMES (June 11,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/12/business/airline-discipline-could-be-costly-for-
passengers.html [https://perma.cc/BL64-VEUQ].
165 Volodymyr Bilotkach, Oil Prices Have Nosedived. Why Aren’t Airfares Doing the
Same?, WASH. POST (Dec. 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/
2014/12/25/oil-prices-have-nosedived-why-arent-airfares-doing-the-same/?utm_term=.eff0e4
715c96 [https://perma.cc/58T2-XN97].
166 Drew Harwell, Airlines Are Making Record Profits, But Don’t Expect a Cheaper Seat,
WASH. POST (Apr. 30, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2015/04/30/
airlines-are-making-record-profits-but-dont-expect-a-cheaper-seat/ [https://perma.cc/Q5R5-
TELN].
167 Severin Borenstein, Why Can’t U.S. Airlines Make Money?, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 233,
233–34 (2011).
168 Jad Mouawad, Airlines Reap Record Profits, and Passengers Get Peanuts, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 6, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/07/business/energy-environment/airlines-
reap-record-profits-and-passengers-get-peanuts.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/6E6J-CH7X].
169 Id.
170 Martin Schmalz, Warren Buffett Is Betting the Airline Oligopoly Is Here to Stay, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Nov. 17, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/11/warren-buffett-is-betting-the-airline-oli-
gopoly-is-here-to-stay [https://perma.cc/Q6UJ-9TDJ].
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The deregulation of the airline industry also ushered in the development
of the hub-and-spoke model—an outcome that some deregulation advocates
did not foresee and one that has produced monopolized hub airports.171 In-
stead of offering direct point-to-point service, airlines typically route fliers
through one of their hubs. Hubs dominated by one airline include Dallas-
Fort Worth (American) and Atlanta (Delta).172 Empirical research has found
that higher concentration at an airport is associated with higher fares.173
These findings suggest that, by establishing a so-called fortress hub that it
dominates, an airline can insulate itself from competition and make larger
profits than it would at a more competitive airport.
In light of the economic attraction of hubs, dominant airlines have
taken a number of measures to impede and exclude new entrants. Dominant
hub carriers have resorted to predatory pricing—short periods of below-cost
competition—to drive out new entrants that threatened their monopolistic
position.174 Among other carriers, American Airlines at Dallas Fort-Worth
and Northwest at its Detroit hub appear to have resorted to deep, but short-
lived, price cuts to exclude new rivals and maintain their hub market
power.175 These campaigns have succeeded, in light of the fragile financial
positions of many of the new entrants, and perpetuated the hub carriers’
dominance.176 Monopolistic hub carriers also appear to have built large hold-
ings of slots and thereby deprived rivals of the access that they need to serve
an airport.177 Some carriers appear to have exchanged and purchased an ex-
cess number of airport slots (the right to take off or land) to shore up hub
dominance and deny rivals access to these airports.178
171 See, e.g., Alfred E. Kahn, Surprises of Airline Deregulation, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 316,
318 (1988).
172 Justin Bachman, This Is Why No Airline Will Ever Dominate LAX, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 2,
2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-02/this-is-why-no-airline-will-ever-
dominate-lax [https://perma.cc/NH7M-KHAC].
173 Borenstein & Rose, supra note 156, at 44; see also Ashutosh Dixit et al., Aggressive
and Predatory Pricing: Insights and Empirical Examination in the Airline Industry, 25 J. PUB.
POL’Y & MKTG. 172, 184 (2006) (“Our descriptive studies show increasing concentration and
yield premiums within the major airline hubs.”).
174 Dixit et al., supra note 173, at 184.
175 See Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 953 (6th Cir. 2005);
United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1111 (10th Cir. 2003); Aaron S. Edlin, Stopping
Above-Cost Predatory Pricing, 111 YALE L.J. 941, 981 (2001).
176 Edlin, supra note 175, at 980–81, 983–84.
177
MORTON ET AL., supra note 160, at 40–43.
178 Justin Bachman, Forget About Airline Mergers. Now It’s All About Trading Airport
Slots, BLOOMBERG (June 16, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-16/for
get-about-airline-mergers-now-it-s-all-about-trading-airport-slots [https://perma.cc/PPA2-
UTH4]; see also Jad Mouawad, Justice Department Opposes United-Delta Swap for Newark
Landing Slots, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/11/business/
united-delta-deal-at-newark-opposed-by-justice-department.html [https://perma.cc/H22G-TE9
Y].
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2. Electricity
With the shift away from utility regulation to market-based pricing at
the wholesale level, the lack of competition has become a serious and persis-
tent issue in electricity markets. Across the country, the generation sector
has been opened up to new entry and competition, even as transmission and
distribution remain natural monopolies. Despite the benefits touted by pro-
ponents, wholesale markets have proven structurally vulnerable to the exer-
cise of market power by generators.179 In electricity markets that are not
structurally competitive, the logic of withholding capacity is straightforward:
because the demand for electricity is inelastic, higher prices are not likely to
lower volume of sales. Instead, raising prices can pay off handsomely be-
cause “collecting $120 for 83% of your fleet of electric power plants pro-
duces 99% more revenue than getting $50 for 100% of the fleet.”180
Four episodes of anticompetitive behavior—one in California, another
in New York, and two more recent ones in New England and the Mid-
Atlantic—exemplify the high consumer cost of market power in electricity
markets. Given that electricity is essential and that residential electric supply
is a nearly $180 billion dollars per year industry,181 even the occasional exer-
cise of market power can cost consumers billions of dollars.
Although California’s wholesale electricity markets performed competi-
tively during their first two years of operation in 1998 and 1999,182 a wave of
anticompetitive behavior starting in late 2000 showed the shortcoming of
how electricity markets have been structured.183 The manner in which the
market had been set up proved to be a critical mistake. Due to reduced hy-
dropower generation in the Pacific Northwest, a major source of electricity
for California, the state became heavily reliant on in-state generation in
2000.184 During the restructuring of the industry, the vertically-integrated,
regulated utility companies sold most of their natural gas generation facili-
ties to just five companies.185 In the absence of adequate import competition,
these five generators could unilaterally withhold capacity and raise whole-
sale market prices above competitive levels.186 Manipulative trading strate-
179 Sandeep Vaheesan, Market Power in Power Markets: The Filed-Rate Doctrine and
Competition in Electricity, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 921, 928–32 (2013).
180 David Cay Johnston, How Electricity Auctions Are Rigged to Favor Industry, AL
JAZEERA AM. (May 29, 2014), http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/5/electricity-auc-
tionpricespowerbillsconsumers.html [https://perma.cc/2UUR-3WFT].
181 2014 Total Electric Industry-Revenue (Thousands Dollars), U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN,
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/sales_revenue_price/pdf/table3.pdf [https://perma.cc/WJ74-
RB4Q].
182 Frank A. Wolak, Diagnosing the California Electricity Crisis, 16 ELECTRICITY J. 11, 20
(2003).
183 Id.
184 Id. at 21.
185 Severin Borenstein, The Trouble with Electricity Markets: Understanding California’s
Restructuring Disaster, 16 J. ECON PERSPS. 191, 195 (2002).
186 Wolak, supra note 182, at 23.
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gies orchestrated by Enron exacerbated the abuse of market power.187 At the
retail level, prices were capped in much of the state.188 The combination of
high wholesale prices and fixed retail prices meant that utilities serving cus-
tomers hemorrhaged money, resulting in rolling blackouts and one of the
largest utility companies in the state filing for bankruptcy.189
This crisis lasted from late 2000 until the summer of 2001 and inflicted
massive harm on California residents. The devastating blackouts belied the
fact that generators held more than sufficient capacity within the state to
meet demand.190 The crisis was most likely the product of generators acting
independently (that is, without colluding with each other) to create artificial
shortages that boosted their profits.191 As a result of rampant anticompetitive
behavior by these firms, the public is estimated to have paid close to twenty
billion dollars more for electricity during the affected period in 2000 and
2001 than it would have had markets been competitive.192
On the East Coast, New York experienced a costly period of anticompe-
titive behavior from 2006 to 2008. Due to insufficient transmission connec-
tions with upstate New York, New York City is dependent on generators
within its five boroughs, particularly during periods of peak demand.193 At
the time, generation ownership within New York City was highly concen-
trated.194 After potential antitrust obstacles thwarted its attempt to buy a
competing generation facility, Keyspan—one of the in-city generators—en-
tered into a financial swap agreement that gave it an economic interest in
this rival.195 With this quasi-equity stake, Keyspan successfully raised prices
in the capacity market,196 where utility companies purchase generation to
meet peak demand and maintain adequate reserves.197 This arrangement is
187 Severin Borenstein et al., Inefficiencies and Market Power in Financial Arbitrage: A
Study of California’s Electricity Markets, 56 J. INDUS. ECON. 347, 371 (2008).
188 Wolak, supra note 182, at 16.
189 Id. at 29.
190 Id. at 25.
191 See Frank A. Wolak, Measuring Unilateral Market Power in Wholesale Electricity
Markets: The California Market, 1998-2000, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 425, 430 (2003).
192 Frank A. Wolak, Managing Unilateral Market Power in Electricity 7 (World Bank
Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3691, 2005). In the summer of 2000 alone, ratepayers are
estimated to have paid  over four billion dollars more due to the exercise of market power. See
Severin Borenstein, James B. Bushnell & Frank Wolak, Measuring Market Inefficiencies in
California’s Restructured Wholesale Electricity Market, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1376, 1398
(2002).
193 Transmission Congestion Drives Power Price Division Between Upstate and Down-
state New York, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Sept. 26, 2011), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/
detail.cfm?id=3230 [https://perma.cc/G8ZJ-DJ84].
194 United States v. Keyspan Corp., 763 F. Supp. 2d 633, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
195 Id. at 636.
196 Id. at 635.
197 ICAP Data & Information, NEW YORK INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR (2016), http://www.ny
iso.com/public/markets_operations/market_data/icap/index.jsp [https://perma.cc/6JVT-FSU
N].
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estimated to have increased capacity market costs by nearly $160 million
dollars in 2006 alone.198
Over the past two years, officials have uncovered evidence of manipu-
lation in the Mid-Atlantic and New England capacity markets. In both mar-
kets, firms have bought up generation assets and then gone on to
dramatically increase capacity market prices. In New England, for example,
prices more than doubled over the previous year after a private equity fund
bought—and almost immediately shut down—a large coal-fired power plant
in Connecticut.199 This action raised capacity market costs by an estimated
$1.7 billion.200 In the wholesale market that covers the Mid-Atlantic and
parts of the Midwest, Exelon submitted high bids on three nuclear power
plants in the capacity market, causing prices to rise and capacity market
costs to balloon by $3.7 billion.201 This price increase occurred just a few
years after Exelon had acquired Constellation, a major Mid-Atlantic power
generator.202
III. HOW OLIGOPOLISTS AND MONOPOLISTS ALSO RIG POLITICS
AND POLICY IN THEIR FAVOR
As described above, powerful firms in concentrated markets possess
greater ability to extract wealth from consumers and producers than they
would in competitive markets. Another way in which concentrated market
structures can have regressive wealth effects is through the levers of politics
and policy. Firms that achieve economic dominance in their sectors also gain
political influence, which they can marshal to sway policy in their favor.
The idea that market power has political significance was foundational
to the passage of the Sherman Act. At the most basic level, proponents un-
derstood that concentration of economic power concentrates political power,
posing a threat to democracy akin to monarchy or dictatorship. Responding
to the large industrial entities that had developed through the late 1800s, one
article denounced the growth of concentrated economic power as a “great,
unscrupulous, powerful plutocracy.”203 Another warned of the “political
menace that was resident in these stupendous aggregations of wealth.”204
The Sherman Act itself was widely understood as following in a tradition
that “aimed to control political power through decentralization of economic
198 Motion to Comment of Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., etc., Re N.Y. Indep.
Sys. Operator, FERC Docket No. ER07-360 (Jan. 27, 2009).
199 Motion to Intervene and Protest of George Jepsen, Att’y Gen. for the State of Conn. at
7, No. ER14-1409 (Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, April 14, 2014).
200 Id. at 8.
201 Rich Heidorn Jr. & Ted Caddell, How Exelon Won by Losing, RTO INSIDER (June 3,
2014), http://www.rtoinsider.com/exelon-pjm-capacity-mkt/ [https://perma.cc/BRW6-2AB3].
202 Joel Kirkland, Exelon-Constellation Deal Could Create ‘Clean Energy’ Giant, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 29, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2011/04/29/29climatewire-exelon-con-
stellation-deal-could-create-clean-83126.html [https://perma.cc/SQX2-XFSN].
203 D. M. Mickey, Trusts, 22 AM. L. REV. 538, 549 (1888).
204 Andrews, Trusts According to Official Investigations, 3 Q.J. ECON. 117, 150 (1889).
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power.”205 Former President and future Supreme Court Justice William
Howard Taft sounded a similar theme and argued that antitrust legislation
was essential in combating the “plutocracy” of the “great and powerful cor-
porations which had, many of them, intervened in politics and through use of
corrupt machines and bosses threatened us.”206
Though contemporary antitrust analysis disregards the political ramifi-
cations of market power, large corporations have significant power and in-
fluence over politics and policy.207 Concentrated markets, in which few
players dominate, aggrandize corporate influence over politics and policy in
at least two ways. First, an industry characterized by five hundred firms of
varying sizes, with different leadership and business philosophies, will typi-
cally share a more heterogeneous set of goals than an industry controlled by
five firms. In an industry with fewer participants, there are less likely to be
conflicts and more likely to be an agreed upon set of common interests.208
And second, a smaller group of concentrated interests will face a lower cost
of organizing than the larger groups of dispersed interests. In general, fewer
actors will mean that the industry can more easily solve collective action
problems, be it through jointly identifying what to demand, sharing costs of
lobbying, or producing effective messaging.209 In some instances, a single
large entity may even find it worthwhile to act unilaterally. In short, concen-
tration increases the likelihood that actors will share interests and decreases
the costs of organizing to advocate for their agenda.
While empirical research on this subject is mixed, evidence suggests
that concentration and industry lobbying activity are related.210 Research ex-
amining industry size, structure, and rent-seeking backs this finding: “a
study of six thousand publicly traded firms’ reported lobbying from 1999 to
2006 showed that corporate lobbying is directly related to firm size.”211 Po-
205 David K. Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
1219, 1220 (1988).
206
WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, THE ANTI-TRUST ACT AND THE SUPREME COURT 4 (1914).
207 See Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites,
Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSPS. ON POL. 564, 565 (2014) (“The central
point that emerges from our research is that economic elites and organized groups representing
business interests have substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while
mass-based interest groups and average citizens have little or no independent influence.”).
208 See, e.g., Adam Levitin, Glass-Steagall Is Campaign Finance Reform, CREDIT SLIPS
(Nov. 29, 2015), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2015/11/glass-steagall-is-campaign-fi-
nance-reform.html [https://perma.cc/V4NA-CZ96] (“By splitting up the financial services in-
dustry into squabbling factions, the result will be a substantial reduction in the influence of any
particular section of the industry. Divide et impera.”).
209 See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS
AND THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
210 See generally Jeffrey Drope & Wendy Hansen, New Evidence for the Theory of
Groups: Trade Association Lobbying in Washington, D.C., 62 POL. RES. Q. 303 (2009).
211 Zephyr Teachout, Corporate Rules as Political Rules: Antitrust as Campaign Finance
Reform 34 (Fordham Law Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 238418, 2014), https://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2384182 [https://perma.cc/W8DC-RQVH] (citing
Matthew D. Hill, G. Wayne Kelly, G. Brandon Lockhart & Robert A. Van Ness, Determinants
and Effects of Corporate Lobbying, FIN. MGMT. 931, 944–55 (2013)).
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litical theory, meanwhile, suggests that several factors shape the type of rent-
seeking that firms choose to undertake; almost all are positively correlated
with company size.212
Recent observations linking economic concentration to increased politi-
cal influence have remained largely broad and vague about how firms trans-
late economic dominance into political power.213 Insofar as observers do
detail the connection, they generally point to corporate donations to political
campaigns.214 No doubt, funding of elections is a key lever companies use to
exercise political power. However, it is worth identifying the larger set of
activities that fall in this toolbox, including lobbying, staffing and recruiting
from government, creating information, directing the politics of employees
and contractors, and threatening sector failure or collapse.215
Finance presents a particularly salient example for understanding how
possession of market powers aids or facilitates the exercise of political influ-
ence. As Simon Johnson and James Kwak have traced, a wave of mergers in
the 1990s transformed the banking sector, yielding banks that were not just
bigger but also involved in riskier financial activities. Their goal was to
create ubiquitous financial “supermarkets” that would be indis-
pensable to both retail and corporate customers. A new divide
emerged in the industry as a result: a handful of megabanks on the
one hand, and a suite of smaller traditional banks on the other.
These megabanks—awash in unprecedented amounts of money—
became “the new financial oligarchy.”216
Since “the basic principle behind any oligarchy is that economic power
yields political power,”217 the megabanks soon concentrated their political
efforts, flooding political campaigns with donations, staffing government,
and generally propagating the idea that a large and unregulated financial
sector would drive widespread prosperity.218 Politicians duly complied.
Leading members of Congress sponsored the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act,
which largely repealed the Glass-Steagall separation of commerce and in-
vestment banking, and the Commodities Futures Modernization Act, which
prohibited federal regulation of over-the-counter derivatives.219 The sector
212 See id.
213 See, e.g., Robert Reich, The Political Roots of Widening Inequality, THE AMERICAN
PROSPECT (Apr. 28, 2015), http://prospect.org/article/political-roots-widening-inequality
[https://perma.cc/RFP4-G6GG] (“I’ve come to believe [the standard explanation] overlooks a
critically important phenomenon: the increasing concentration of political power in a corporate
and financial elite that has been able to influence the rules by which the economy runs.”).
214 See, e.g., ROBERT REICH, SAVING CAPITALISM: FOR THE MANY, NOT THE FEW 168
(2015).
215 See Zephyr Teachout & Lina Khan, Market Structure and Political Law: A Taxonomy
of Power, 9 DUKE J. CONST. LAW & POLICY 37, 42–53 (2014).
216
JAMES KWAK & SIMON JOHNSON, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE
NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 10 (2010).
217 Id. at 74.
218 Id. at 5–10.
219 Id. at 89–95.
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continued amassing political influence up until and through the financial cri-
sis. As Senator Richard Durbin remarked in 2009, “[T]he banks—hard to
believe in a time when we’re facing a banking crisis that many of the banks
created—are still the most powerful lobby on Capitol Hill. And frankly they
own the place.”220
In addition to drawing on these more traditional mechanisms of politi-
cal influence, the banking sector leveraged its size and structure to yield
favorable terms during the bailout and its aftermath.221 This is not to say that
executives created a “too big to fail” system for the purpose of wielding
political power, but that the practical consequences of consolidation, by con-
centrating risk, did just that. Banking, of course, plays a uniquely central
role in our economy; not all highly concentrated markets possess systemic
fragility of the sort that firms can exploit in times of instability or uncer-
tainty. Yet, the potential for great political power may span sectors such as
commodities and pharmaceuticals.222
The fact that companies in concentrated sectors can wield outsized po-
litical influence has distributive implications. Business interests frequently
lobby against regulations from which workers and consumers stand to gain.
To take just one example: in 2009, the Packers and Stockyards Administra-
tion within the U.S. Department of Agriculture proposed rules that would
have protected independent farmers from abusive practices by powerful
processors and packers—regulations that would have helped halt the down-
ward pressure on payments these firms make to farmers.223 Yet a fierce lob-
bying effort by trade groups representing the biggest firms in this highly
concentrated industry ultimately prompted Congress to thwart the adminis-
tration, stalling the new rules.224
IV. HOW THE ANTITRUST COUNTERREVOLUTION CREATED
UNCOMPETITIVE MARKETS
Highly concentrated markets in the contemporary United States are not
the product of impersonal economic forces—rather they are the product of
conscious legal and political decisions in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
These decisions severely undermined the antitrust laws, crippling what had
220 Id. at 92.
221 See generally SHEILA BAIR, BULL BY THE HORNS: FIGHTING TO SAVE MAIN STREET
FROM WALL STREET AND WALL STREET FROM ITSELF (2012); NEIL BAROFSKY, BAILOUT: HOW
WASHINGTON ABANDONED MAIN STREET WHILE RESCUING WALL STREET (2012).
222 Indeed, consolidation trends among commodity traders prompted one European think
tank to suggest that these trading houses—which underpin global trade in raw materials—may
have “systemic” implications. See Neil Hume, Are Commodities Traders “Too Big to Fail”?,
FIN. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2013), https://www.ft.com/content/86b94d18-5ce6-11e3-81bd-00144feab
dc0 [https://perma.cc/E7BQ-QHL3].
223 See CHRISTOPHER LEONARD, THE MEAT RACKET 284 (2014); Khan, supra note 126.
224 Khan, supra note 126.
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been a major congressional safeguard against monopoly and oligopoly.225
Two policy decisions stand out above others. First, beginning with the Rea-
gan administration, the antitrust agencies and federal courts held that the
antitrust laws should protect the neoclassical concept of “efficiency.”226
Congress, in enacting the antitrust laws, had expressed very different aims—
protecting consumers and small suppliers from wealth-redistributing monop-
olies, oligopolies, and cartels; maintaining open markets; and dispersing eco-
nomic and political power.227 The conservative conception of antitrust has, at
most, acknowledged only the first of these three goals. Second—in a reflec-
tion of this new orientation—the antitrust agencies and the Supreme Court
went on to abandon simple rules and presumptions, adopting the defendant-
friendly rule of reason and other similarly open-ended standards to govern
most forms of business conduct.228
The Reagan-initiated antitrust counterrevolution—perpetuated by sub-
sequent Republican administrations and never seriously questioned by Dem-
ocratic ones—has permitted powerful firms across sectors to control
markets. Insofar as Democratic and Republican administrations have dis-
agreed, it has been over the application of the efficiency standard—namely,
whether a preference for short-term consumer interests should inform anti-
trust law—and enforcement actions at the margins.229 In large measure, anti-
trust specialists in the United States have come to accept this narrow
conception of antitrust—marked by a commitment to some variant of effi-
ciency, with disagreements centered on the application of the rule of rea-
son.230 A once-populist and progressive “law against exploitation has
become the law for exploiters” as “[e]fficiency and power win.”231
A. Efficiency Becomes the Near-Exclusive Goal of Antitrust
With the inauguration of Ronald Reagan in 1981, the federal antitrust
agencies executed a coup against prevailing antitrust thinking. Building on
the rightward shift in antitrust jurisprudence in the 1970s,232 the federal anti-
trust agencies moved to narrow objectives of antitrust law further. William
225 The Supreme Court once described the Sherman Act as “a comprehensive charter of
economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade.” N.
Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
226 Robert H. Lande, The Rise and (Coming) Fall of Efficiency as the Ruler of Antitrust, 33
ANTITRUST BULL. 429, 438–39 (1988).
227 Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals, 53 B.C. L. REV. 551, 560–62
(2012); see also John J. Flynn, supra note 7, at 260–61.
228 See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997).
229 See, e.g., Baker & Salop, supra note 3, at 15–18.
230 Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1159, 1211–13 (2008).
231 Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Antitrust—Retrospective and Prospective:
Where Are We Coming From? Where Are We Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 936, 963 (1987)
(describing the critical legal studies movement’s view of antitrust law as such).
232 See, e.g., Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58–59 (1977) (holding
that rule of reason applies to territorial restraints imposed by manufacturers on distributors);
United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 510–11 (1974) (rejecting government
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLP\11-1\HLP110.txt unknown Seq: 36  2-FEB-17 13:47
270 Harvard Law & Policy Review [Vol. 11
Baxter and James Miller, two conservative academics, were appointed to
head of the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division and Federal Trade
Commission, respectively.233 Both Baxter and Miller subscribed to Robert
Bork’s belief, articulated in The Antitrust Paradox,234 that the antitrust laws
should only promote the neoclassical construct of efficiency.235 According to
Bork, Congress enacted the Clayton, Federal Trade Commission, and Sher-
man Acts only to prohibit conduct that reduced efficiency.236 Under this ahis-
torical paradigm, conduct that did not impair efficiency should be permitted,
regardless of the effects on consumers, producers, competitors, or the politi-
cal economy at large.237 A change in personnel followed this ideological
overhaul, as economists began to play a much larger role at the antitrust
agencies, at the expense of lawyers.238 This shift in agency composition re-
flected and reinforced the shift in ideology, from broad political economy to
narrow microeconomics.239
Baxter, Miller, and numerous federal judges appointed during the Rea-
gan years applied Bork’s interpretation of the antitrust laws, overriding the
will of Congress. These conservative bureaucrats and judges accepted Bork’s
historical analysis. But Bork’s argument—that Congress established antitrust
laws in order to promote efficiency—was made out of whole cloth.
A number of scholars have studied the legislative histories of the anti-
trust laws and shown Bork’s interpretation to be false. The congressmen and
senators involved in the debates preceding the passage of the principal anti-
trust laws voiced a number of concerns, including the protection of consum-
ers and suppliers from firms with market power, the defense of small
businesses from the predatory tactics of large rivals, and the preservation of
democracy.240 Efficiency was not on Congress’s radar in 1890 or 1914. In
fact, the very concept of “efficiency” was not fully formulated by econo-
challenge to merger in coal industry because it failed to show prospective anticompetitive
effects).
233 William E. Kovacic, Reagan’s Judicial Appointees and Antitrust in the 1990s, 60 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 49, 49–50 (1991).
234 See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978).
235 Eleanor M. Fox, Chairman Miller, the Federal Trade Commission, Economics, and
“Rashomon,” LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 37 (1987); Fox & Sullivan, supra note 227, at
945–46.
236
BORK, supra note 234, at 61–66.
237 See Fox & Sullivan, supra note 229, at 945 (“It is often said that extremists are neces-
sary to move tradition a short step. This is, perhaps, what Baxter and the Chicago School have
done. In their intellectual universe, antitrust is embodied in a reductionist paradigm: antitrust
concerns the functioning of markets; microeconomics is the study of the functioning of mar-
kets; therefore, antitrust is microeconomics. The potential and desired effect of markets is the
efficient allocation of resources; therefore, the sole purpose of antitrust is to prevent inefficient
allocation of resources. Private firms can in theory, under certain limited circumstances, misal-
locate resources by obtaining or enhancing market power and artificially restraining output
without offsetting cost reductions; therefore, output reduction without offsetting cost savings is
the only possible antitrust harm.”).
238 Davies, supra note 7, at 77.
239 Id. at 79.
240 See, e.g., 51 CONG. REC. 8850 (1914); 51 CONG. REC. 13, 231 (1914); 21 CONG. REC.
2598 (1890); 21 CONG. REC. 2570 (1890); 21 CONG. REC. 2461 (1890).
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mists themselves until the 1920s.241 In the 1980s, unelected policymakers
and judges retrospectively imposed their conservative ideology on Con-
gress’s original vision.242
In pursuing their ahistorical and anti-democratic elevation of efficiency
above Congress’s stated goals, the proponents of this vision also adopted a
benign view of conduct previously considered anti-competitive, highlighting
the purported efficiency benefits. For example, courts had historically treated
horizontal mergers in concentrated markets,243 tying,244 and vertical re-
straints245 as competitively suspect. Along with Baxter, Miller, and other
new federal antitrust officials,246 judges on the federal bench—such as Bork
himself, Frank Easterbrook, and Richard Posner—abandoned this traditional
approach. They instead claimed that mergers, predatory pricing, tying, and
vertical restraints often had beneficial (namely efficient) purposes and ef-
fects.247 And even when the conduct of monopolists and mergers in concen-
trated markets harmed competition, proponents of the new antitrust
paradigm insisted that markets, left to their own devices, would erode oli-
gopoly and monopoly power.248 With the exception of collusion and mergers
in concentrated markets, the harms from anticompetitive conduct were
largely assumed away. These beliefs have little, if any, empirical support.249
Weak merger enforcement over the past several decades exemplifies
this ideological shift. According to Chicago School precepts, mergers typi-
cally have a benign effect on competition250 and often even yield economies
of scale and scope.251 During and since the Reagan years, government
merger enforcement has reflected these assumptions philosophically252 and
241 Peter C. Carstensen, Antitrust Law and the Paradigm of Industrial Organization, 16
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 487, 487–88 n.1 (1983).
242 See, e.g., KENNETH M. DAVIDSON, REALITY IGNORED: HOW MILTON FRIEDMAN AND
CHICAGO ECONOMICS UNDERMINED AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS AND ENDANGERED THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY 83–84 (2011); James Boyle, A Process of Denial: Bork and Post-Modern Conserva-
tism, 3 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 263, 280 (1991).
243 See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362–63 (1963).
244 N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 2 (1958) (finding that, in a tying arrange-
ment, the purchase of one product is conditioned on the purchase of a second product).
245 See, e.g., United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 43–44 (1960) (noting that
vertical restraints impose limits on what, where, and at what price retailers can sell products
purchased from upstream distributors and manufacturers).
246 Fox, supra note 235, at 49–50.
247 See generally Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U.
PENN. L. REV. 925 (1978); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1
(1984); BORK, supra note 234.
248 Easterbrook, supra note 247, at 32.
249 Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Made (Too) Simple, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 917, 921–26
(2014).
250 Posner, supra note 247, at 928.
251 Easterbrook, supra note 247, at 3.
252 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1982 MERGER GUIDELINES § 1, http://www.justice.gov/
archives/atr/1982-merger-guidelines [https://perma.cc/7PQU-LD5N] (last updated Aug. 4,
2015) (“Although they sometimes harm competition, mergers generally play an important role
in a free enterprise economy. They can penalize ineffective management and facilitate the
efficient flow of investment capital and the redeployment of existing productive assets.”)
[hereinafter 1982 GUIDELINES] ; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, 2010 HORI-
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in practice.253
B. The Rule of Reason Takes Center Stage
By applying this benign view of many forms of anticompetitive con-
duct and maintaining a quasi-religious faith in a “self-regulating” market-
place, the antitrust agencies and federal courts have relaxed antitrust rules.
Specifically, the agencies and courts have moved away from simple rules
and presumptions toward open-ended, fact-intensive legal standards.
The Reagan Department of Justice published merger guidelines that
dramatically weakened government enforcement against harmful corporate
consolidation.254 These guidelines raised the concentration thresholds for an-
ticompetitive horizontal mergers and established broad legality for vertical
mergers.255 The new merger guidelines initiated a shift away from clear
merger rules toward a standards-based approach, which requires the antitrust
agencies to conduct an exhaustive industry study before challenging mergers
in even highly concentrated markets.256 The latest version of the merger
guidelines—the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines257—further raised the
concentration thresholds for competitively problematic mergers, stressed ef-
fects-based analysis, and devalued market shares and market structure.258
Federal judges, too, have adopted standards enshrining a permissive
view of anticompetitive conduct. Over the past forty years, for example, the
Supreme Court has relaxed monopolization doctrine. The Court has ruled
that predatory pricing and refusals-to-deal should be subject to more relaxed
standards that followed the spirit of the rule of reason—open-ended tests
that required plaintiffs to define the relevant market, establish that defend-
ZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 10, https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-
review/100819hmg.pdf [https://perma.cc/JT2F-H989] (“[A] primary benefit of mergers to
the economy is their potential to generate significant efficiencies and thus enhance the merged
firm’s ability and incentive to compete, which may result in lower prices, improved quality,
enhanced service, or new products.”).
253 The number of merger cases filed annually by the Department of Justice has remained
fairly constant since the early 1980s. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIV., WORKLOAD
STATISTICS: FY 1980–1989 5, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2011/09/
13/215423.pdf [https://perma.cc/TZD4-6DVR] (between 1981 and 1989, the number of
merger cases filed in a year never exceeded eight); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIV.,
WORKLOAD STATISTICS: FY 2006–2015 6, https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/788426/download
[https://perma.cc/S4RN-PJKU] (from 2006 to 2015 and across the Bush and Obama Adminis-
trations, the number of merger cases filed annually remained about the same and ranged from a
low of four in 2007 to a high of fifteen in 2008).
254 1982 GUIDELINES, supra note 252.
255 See Robert Pitofsky, Past, Present, and Future of Antitrust Enforcement at the Federal
Trade Commission, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 209, 221 (2005) (noting that five FTC challenges to
vertical mergers with exclusionary potential between 1993 and 2005 could not have been
brought if the FTC had followed the vertical merger guidelines).
256 Thomas E. Kauper, The 1982 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Of Collusion, Efficiency,
and Failure, 71 CAL. L. REV. 497, 518–19 (1983).
257
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 252.
258 Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: From Hedgehog to Fox in Forty
Years, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 701, 707–08, 721 (2010).
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ants possessed market or monopoly power, and show anticompetitive ef-
fects. Heavily influenced by Bork’s theoretical musings on the topic, the
Court has asserted that predatory pricing is “rarely tried, and even more
rarely successful.”259 Based on this belief, it has imposed a demanding stan-
dard on plaintiffs that requires them not only to prove below-cost pricing at
an early stage of litigation but also “establish” future anticompetitive effects
from this pricing conduct.260 In the context of refusals-to-deal, the Court has
embraced an effects-based analysis261 and, in another instance, asserted that
“the opportunity to charge monopoly prices—at least for a short period—is
what attracts ‘business acumen’ in the first place; it induces risk taking that
produces innovation and economic growth.”262
Some courts and agency officials have gone even further than the Su-
preme Court in favoring monopolists. Rather than recognize the exceptional
power of monopolists, certain courts of appeals have imposed high burdens
on plaintiffs attacking abusive monopolists.263 For example, the Ninth Circuit
has held that plaintiffs must show evidence of below-cost pricing (typically
associated with predatory pricing) when challenging anticompetitive product
bundling by a monopolist.264 A former FTC commissioner joined this pro-
monopoly chorus and wrote that plaintiffs should satisfy a higher “clear evi-
dence” standard (rather than the usual “preponderance of the evidence”
standard in civil cases) in monopolization suits.265
In rewriting antitrust precedent on vertical restraints in a pro-defendant
fashion, the Supreme Court has held that the rule of reason is the default
legal standard.266  The per se rules that applied to vertical price and non-price
restraints have been overturned. This process began with the Supreme
Court’s 1977 decision in Continental Television, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,
which held that vertical non-price restraints should be evaluated using the
rule of reason.267 This freeing of vertical restraints from antitrust proscrip-
tions culminated in the 2007 decision Leegin Creative Leather Products,
Inc. v. PSKS Inc.268 In this landmark ruling, the Court overruled the nearly
259 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986).
260 Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222, 224
(1993).
261 See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 (1985)
(“The question whether Ski Co.’s conduct may properly be characterized as exclusionary can-
not be answered by simply considering its effect on Highlands. In addition, it is relevant to
consider its impact on consumers and whether it has impaired competition in an unnecessarily
restrictive way.”).
262 Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004).
263 See, e.g., Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1079 (10th Cir. 2012) (hold-
ing that plaintiffs alleging anticompetitive refusal-to-deal by a monopolist must show that the
monopolist sacrificed short-term profits by not dealing with a rival).
264 See Cascade Health Sols. v. PeaceHealth, 502 F.3d 895, 913–14 (9th Cir. 2007).
265 In re McWane, Inc., 2014 FTC LEXIS 28, *143 (2014) (Wright, Comm’r, dissenting).
266 See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (“[M]ost antitrust claims are ana-
lyzed under a ‘rule of reason[.]’”).
267 433 U.S. 36, 58 (1977).
268 551 U.S. 877, 907 (2007).
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century-old per se rule outlawing resale price maintenance.269 In the series of
cases that ended with the ruling in Leegin,270 the Court relied on a theoreti-
cal—but empirically unsupported—view of competition in retail markets to
assert that the vertical restraints at issue often had beneficial effects.271
The shift from per se rules and presumptions to the rule of reason and
other standards-based tests has dramatically undercut antitrust enforcement.
Outside of cases alleging collusion, plaintiffs have to define relevant anti-
trust markets, establish that defendants have market power, and show that
the suspect practice has likely anticompetitive effects.272 Antitrust litigation
today requires the retention of economic experts and extensive discovery,
which makes for costly and interminable litigation.273 And often times, plain-
tiffs have to do all this just to survive defendants’ motions to dismiss or
motions for summary judgment. Not surprisingly, these legal standards have
pushed plaintiffs’ probability of success in court in the twenty-first century
practically down to nil.274 With good reason, one of the leaders of the intel-
lectual coup in antitrust, Richard Posner, has described the rule of reason in
practice as “little more than a euphemism for nonliability.”275
These doctrinal changes have dramatically increased the power of busi-
nesses to control and steer how markets and industries develop. Large firms
in concentrated markets today have broad latitude to acquire and merge with
their direct rivals. Recent mergers proposed in oligopolistic markets include
combinations between Anheuser-Busch InBev and SABMiller,276 Dow
Chemical and DuPont,277 Anthem and Cigna, and Aetna and Humana.278 Re-
gardless of whether these pending mergers are stopped in court or modified
269 Id.
270 See also, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 763–64  (1984);
Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 727–28 (1988).
271 See Marina Lao, Free Riding: An Overstated, and Unconvincing, Explanation for Re-
sale Price Maintenance, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK 196, 210 (Rob-
ert Pitofsky ed., 2008).
272 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58–59 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per
curiam) (articulating rule of reason framework as series of five steps).
273 Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1375, 1460–65 (2009).
274 See Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st Cen-
tury, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 837 (2009) (“[Courts] dispose of 97% of rule of reason
cases on the grounds that the plaintiff cannot show an anticompetitive effect.”) [hereinafter
Carrier III].
275 Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the
Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 14 (1977).
276 David Ingold, Will the Justice Department Put the AB InBev Deal on Ice?, BLOOMBERG
(Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2015-anheuser-busch-inbev-sabmiller-lar
gest-beer-takeover/ [https://perma.cc/4YND-9DP3].
277 Drew Harwell, Dow and DuPont, Two of America’s Oldest Giants, to Merge in Jaw-
Dropping Megadeal, WASH. POST (Dec. 11, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
business/wp/2015/12/11/dow-and-dupont-two-of-americas-oldest-giants-to-merge-in-job-drop-
ping-megadeal/ [https://perma.cc/5KH2-P2VV].
278 The Justice Department has sued to enjoin these mergers. Leslie Picker & Reed Abel-
son, U.S. Sues to Block Anthem-Cigna and Aetna-Humana Mergers, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK
(July 21, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/22/business/dealbook/us-sues-to-block-an-
them-cigna-and-aetna-humana-mergers.html [https://perma.cc/WLD3-VPG7].
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLP\11-1\HLP110.txt unknown Seq: 41  2-FEB-17 13:47
2017] The Antitrust Counterrevolution 275
through a consent decree, the fact that they are even being proposed—given
their size—reveals the degree to which contemporary merger law has been
enfeebled.
Dominant and other powerful firms also have broad freedom to
marginalize their rivals and dictate terms to other players.  With the current
permissive treatment of predatory pricing, refusals-to-deal, and other exclu-
sionary conduct, dominant firms have the ability to smother their smaller
rivals and protect their monopoly power. In consumer goods markets, pow-
erful manufacturers and retailers can establish vertical restraints that raise
final prices and hamper the entry and growth of smaller competitors.
Even in the main area of antitrust, in which public enforcement remains
relatively strong, courts have erected significant obstacles. Collusion is the
one form of anticompetitive conduct still subject to strict rules279—and often
appears to be the only type of conduct that draws consistent interest from the
antitrust agencies.280 Private plaintiffs, however, face major procedural road-
blocks when pursuing these cases. Parties injured by collusive activity now
have to present much more evidence in support of their complaints before
they have had an opportunity to conduct in-depth factual discovery through
the judicial process.281 Courts have also dramatically expanded the purview
of mandatory arbitration, permitting firms accused of collusion to use con-
tractual provisions to bar private class actions.282
V. WHAT CAN BE DONE TO TACKLE THE OLIGOPOLISTIC AND
MONOPOLISTIC DOMINATION OF MARKETS AND SOCIETY
The result of this counterrevolution in antitrust—originating as an intel-
lectual movement led by the Chicago School, stamped into policy by the
Reagan administration283—is that markets across sectors are highly concen-
trated.284 Powerful corporate actors that control our markets inflict major
damage on the American economy, society, and democracy. But the antitrust
status quo can be changed. Just as Reagan’s executive and judicial appoin-
279 Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004)
(describing collusion as “the supreme evil of antitrust”); Harry First & Spencer Weber Waller,
Antitrust’s Democracy Deficit, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2543, 2569 (2013) (“[The antitrust] sys-
tem fell into disrepair as most practices, except hardcore cartel behavior, became subject to
some form of the rule of reason.”).
280 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIV., WORKLOAD STATISTICS: FY
2006–2015, supra note 253, at 5–6 (indicating that the Antitrust Division filed forty-five crim-
inal collusion or bid-rigging cases versus eight civil—zero Section 1, zero Section 2 cases,
seven Section 7, and one other—cases in 2014).
281 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
282 See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013) (hold-
ing that the Federal Arbitration Act requires the enforcement of arbitration clauses that include
class action waivers even when individual litigation would be economically infeasible).
283
DAVIDSON, supra note 242, at 66–73. R
284 Too Much of a Good Thing, ECONOMIST (Mar. 26, 2016), http://www.economist.com/
news/briefing/21695385-profits-are-too-high-america-needs-giant-dose-competition-too-
much-good-thing [https://perma.cc/FV6K-797F].
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tees deposed a century of antitrust thinking, their vision, in turn, can be
abandoned. The antitrust agencies and courts can take actions to align the
goals of antitrust with the vision of Congress when it passed the Sherman,
Clayton, and Federal Trade Commission Acts. Antitrust should protect con-
sumers from anticompetitive overcharges and small producers from an-
ticompetitive underpayments, preserve open markets, and disperse economic
and political power. While this “citizen interest” standard would not adopt
redistribution as an explicit goal, applying it would likely help mitigate
inequality.
To advance the citizen interest standard, a number of policy reforms are
essential. First, antitrust doctrine should be simplified to ease enforcement
and avoid interminable and largely fruitless inquiries into market dynamics.
Second, antitrust should also address markets characterized by durable mo-
nopoly power or otherwise harmful market power and seek to restore com-
petition. Third, if simpler, more competition-friendly doctrine is to be
effective, it must be accompanied by strong remedies that promote competi-
tive market structure, rather than attempt to contain market power through
complicated conduct remedies. Fourth, while substantive changes are impor-
tant, process must also change. The federal antitrust agencies must be more
transparent and accountable.
The restoration of a progressive-populist antitrust under the citizen in-
terest standard will not be an easy task and will take time. Antitrust officials
and judges committed to the current way of thinking are unlikely to realize
this goal. A Congress dominated by Republicans and business-friendly
Democrats is even less likely to act.
All hope of an antitrust revival is not lost, however. In recent decades,
the common law approach to antitrust has largely been used to retrench anti-
trust.285 This judicial flexibility, however, has the potential to be used to re-
vive an expansive vision of antitrust. In fact, the Reagan counterrevolution
offers a model for those who believe in the untapped potential of the anti-
trust laws to protect consumers, preserve open markets, and safeguard de-
mocracy from concentrated private power. Reagan believed in a pro-
corporate ideology and appointed antitrust enforcers and judges who shared
his philosophy and had well-developed ideas on scaling back antitrust. A
president with a progressive economic outlook, who appoints antitrust en-
forcers and judges with a commitment to the citizen interest standard, can
revive a vital body of law that has been anemic for the past several decades.
285 See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) (“[S]tare decisis is not an inexorable
command. In the area of antitrust law, there is a competing interest, well-represented in this
Court’s decisions, in recognizing and adapting to changed circumstances and the lessons of
accumulated experience. Thus, the general presumption that legislative changes should be left
to Congress has less force with respect to the Sherman Act in light of the accepted view that
Congress expected the courts to give shape to the statute’s broad mandate by drawing on
common-law tradition.”).
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A. The Goals of Antitrust Should Reflect Congress’s Vision in Enacting
the Clayton, Federal Trade Commission, and Sherman Acts
While scholars have spilled much ink debating Congress’s vision in en-
acting the antitrust laws passed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries,286 there was no real debate until the 1970s.  The Supreme Court
routinely acknowledged that Congress intended to promote a variety of po-
litical and economic aims, and that the task of the judge was to seek to
balance them.287 Only after Bork had declared that the main goal of Congress
in passing the Sherman Act was instead to enhance economic efficiency—
defined as the sum of consumers’ and producers’ welfare288—did the intent
of Congress become a point of contention. Stunningly, Bork’s revisionist
account has become mainstream, ratified by nearly four decades’ worth of
Supreme Court jurisprudence.289
Many legal scholars have studied the major antitrust statutes and shown
that Bork’s argument about efficiency is not supported by the legislative his-
tory.290 Centrally, the passage of the Sherman Act was animated by at least
three goals: (1) the distribution of political economic power, (2) the preven-
tion of unjust wealth transfers from consumers and small suppliers to large
entities, and (3) the preservation of open markets.291 As scholars have noted,
conflicting statements of legislative purpose make it impossible to identify a
single, tidy aim. In fact, it is undeniable that a multitude of political, social,
and economic concerns animated lawmakers. Leading economists of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had “very little influence” over the
passage of the antitrust statutes.292 And moreover, efficiency is “a concept
that economists only defined after the passage of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act and Clayton Act in 1914.”293
286 Barak Orbach, Foreword: Antitrust’s Pursuit of Purpose, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2151,
2152 (2013).
287 See, e.g., Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PENN. L. REV.
1051, 1053, 1056, 1070 (1979).
288 See BORK, supra note 234, at 405; Robert Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the
Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7, 44 (1966).
289 John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: Protecting
Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191, 192 (2008) (“The con-
ventional wisdom in the antitrust community is that the antitrust laws were passed to promote
economic efficiency.”). As the authors note, Bork was not alone in promoting a vision of
antitrust that privileges efficiency. What was unique about Bork’s efforts is that he seeded his
efficiency argument in the legislative history of the Sherman Act, ensuring that “he would win
the argument not just while the Chicago School was in power, but for all time.” Id. at 193 n.4.
290 See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66
CORNELL L. REV. 1140, 1146 (1981); Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and
Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L. J. 65,
80–104 (1982); David Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
1219, 1235 (1988).
291 See Fox, supra note 290, at 1182; id. at 1146 (citing 51 CONG. REC. 9265 (1914)
(remarks of Rep. Morgan)).
292 See Lande, supra note 290, at 88–89.
293 See Sandeep Vaheesan, The Evolving Populisms of Antitrust, 93 NEB. L. REV. 370, 406
(2014).
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Since the literature explicating the various non-efficiency based goals is
sizable and comprehensive, only a brief review of these animating goals is
necessary. First, the legislative history reveals that key lawmakers viewed
antitrust through a political lens. When the Sherman Act passed the U.S.
Congress in 1890, Senator John Sherman called it “a bill of rights, a charter
of liberty,” and stressed its importance in both economic and political
terms.294 Senator Sherman viewed the monopolist as just another form of
monarch. On the floor of the Senate in 1890, he declared,
If we will not endure a king as a political power, we should not
endure a king over the production, transportation, and sale of any
of the necessities of life. If we would not submit to an emperor, we
should not submit to an autocrat of trade, with power to prevent
competition and to fix the price of any commodity.295
One way to understand the political valence of antitrust is through an
integrated conception of power—namely, the notion that the distribution of
economic ownership and control is intimately bound up in, and has deep
implications for, the distribution and exercise of political power.  There are
at least two facets to this. First is the idea that concentration of economic
power concentrates political power through, for example, the accrual of
wealth, which can be used as a lever of political influence. Second is the
belief that the effects of concentrated economic power are, themselves, fun-
damentally political, given that excessive economic concentration tends to
“breed antidemocratic political pressures,” whereas “reducing the range
within which private discretion by a few in the economic sphere controls the
welfare of all” enhances individual and business freedom.296 Leading up to
the passage of the Clayton Act, for example, Senator George Hoar warned
that monopolies were “a menace to republican institutions themselves.”297
A second motivating goal was to prevent unjust wealth transfers from
consumers to firms with market power.298 Throughout the debates,
lawmakers denounced monopolies for extracting wealth from consumers and
turning it into monopoly profits. Senator Sherman, for example, called
overcharges by monopolists “extortion which makes the people poor,”299
while Congressman Richard Coke described them as “robbery.”300 Repre-
sentative John Heard declared that trusts had “stolen untold millions from
the people,”301 and Representative Ezra Taylor noted that the beef trust “robs
the farmer on the one hand and the consumer on the other.”302 As Senator
294 21 CONG. REC. 2461 (1890).
295 Id. 2455, 2457 (1890).
296 Pitofsky, supra note 287, at 1051.
297 51 CONG. REC. 8850 (1914).
298 Lande, supra note 290, at 92–96.
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James George observed, “They aggregate to themselves great enormous
wealth by extortion which makes the people poor.”303
Strikingly, this concern with wealth transfers was not simply economic.
As Robert Lande has explained, prior to the passage of the Sherman Act,
price levels in the United States were stable or slowly declining.304 If the
primary concern had been steep prices, then Congress could have focused on
industries where prices were high. Congress’s choice to denounce unjust re-
distribution in and of itself suggests that the public was “angered less by the
reduction in their wealth than by the way in which the wealth was ex-
tracted,” through excesses of market power.305
A third distinct goal was the preservation of open markets, to ensure
that independent entrepreneurs had an opportunity to enter. A number of
Congressmen supported the creation of the Federal Trade Commission Act
with the idea that it would help protect small business. Senator Reed stated
that Congress passed the law to keep markets open to independent busi-
nesses.306 Predicting what would happen if big business was permitted to
expand unchecked, Senator George warned that it would “crush out all small
men, all small capitalists, all small enterprises.”307
In summary, ample scholarship documents that Congress had multiple
political economic goals when enacting the Sherman Act, the Federal Trade
Commission Act, and the Clayton Act. None of the central sponsors of these
laws spoke of the need to increase allocative efficiency in the terms that
Bork would later insist. Insofar as “efficiency” appeared in the debates at
all, it was used in the context of arguing that purchasers should receive a
“fair share” of these benefits.308 When interpreting antitrust laws, the anti-
trust agencies and courts should hew to this expansive intent.
B. Simpler Legal Standards Should Govern Mergers, Monopolization,
and Vertical Restraints
If antitrust law is to be revived and protect consumers and suppliers
from powerful sellers and buyers, maintain open markets, and disperse eco-
nomic and political power, antitrust enforcers and courts must eschew the
open-ended rule of reason and adopt simple presumptions for many forms of
anticompetitive conduct. Agencies and courts cannot achieve the pluralistic
vision Congress had when it enacted the antitrust statutes by applying the
rule of reason. For example, it is not possible to balance the cost savings
from a merger against the costs of the enhanced long-term economic and
political power of the larger corporation. Rules and presumptions would pro-
mote the multiple goals that the Congresses of 1890 and 1914 sought to
303 Id. 1768.
304 Lande, supra note 290, at 96–97.
305 Id. at 98.
306 51 CONG. REC. 13,231 (1914).
307 21 CONG. REC. 2598 (1890).
308 Lande, supra note 290, at 93.
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advance, reduce the complexity and cost of antitrust investigations and liti-
gation, and simplify legal compliance for businesses. Specifically, simple
presumptions of illegality, subject to rebuttal through the introduction of
credible business justifications, should govern, at a minimum, horizontal
mergers in concentrated markets, monopolization, and vertical restraints.
As a basic matter, it is far from clear that the agencies and courts can
apply the rule of reason standard effectively even when they focus on pro-
moting efficiency. Weighing short-term efficiency gains against price ef-
fects, let alone long-term losses in dynamic and productive efficiencies, is a
largely speculative undertaking and involves balancing incommensurate and
largely unknowable quantities.309 This infirmity is especially acute in the
realm of prospective merger reviews.310 The merits of current agency prac-
tice and court decisions have not been empirically confirmed.311 The agen-
cies and courts continue to assume, on the basis of very thin evidence, that
the complex and interminable inquiries demanded by the rule of reason and
other standards produce superior outcomes.312 But mounting evidence sug-
gests just the opposite: that this approach has neither lowered prices nor led
to efficiency gains.313 In other words, the efficiency-based approach has
failed even on its own terms. It appears that the agencies have achieved the
worst of all possible worlds by embracing nebulous legal standards that pro-
duce neither procedural efficiency nor substantive accuracy.314
309 Stucke, supra note 273, at 1442.
310 See Allen P. Grunes & Maurice E. Stucke, Antitrust Review of the AT&T/T-Mobile
Transaction, 64 FED. COMM. L.J. 47, 56 (2011); Rebecca Haw Allensworth, The Commensura-
bility Myth in Antitrust, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1, 4 (2016) (“Antitrust law often must trade off one
kind of competition for another, or one salutary effect of competition (such as price, quality or
innovation) for another. And in so doing, antitrust courts must make judgments between differ-
ent and incommensurate values.”).
311 See Marc Allen Eisner & Kenneth J. Meier, Presidential Control Versus Bureaucratic
Power: Explaining the Reagan Revolution in Antitrust, 34 AM. J. POL. SCI. 269, 277 n.7 (1990)
(“The triumph of the Chicago school was not related to empirical evidence. The Chicago
school, in fact, declared a variety of empirical tests irrelevant and argued that its position was
closer to the heart of the microeconomic price theory. The Chicago school victory was a politi-
cal victory not an empirical one.”) (citation omitted).
312 Lawrence M. Frankel, The Flawed Institutional Design of U.S. Merger Review: Stack-
ing the Deck Against Enforcement, 2008 UTAH. L. REV. 159, 163–69 (describing the profound
challenges and uncertainties of current merger review practice).
313 See JOHN KWOKA, MERGERS, MERGER CONTROL, AND REMEDIES: A RETROSPECTIVE
ANALYSIS OF U.S. POLICY 155 (2015) (“Of all mergers that resulted in price increases, the
agencies acted in only 38 percent of cases, suggesting substantial under-enforcement. Incor-
rectly cleared mergers on average resulted in price increases in excess of 10 percent.”); Bruce
A. Bloningen & Justice R. Pierce, Evidence for the Effects of Mergers on Market Power and
Efficiency 24 (Fed. Reserve Bd. Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2016-082,
2016) (“We find that evidence for increased average markups from [mergers and acquisitions]
activity [in the manufacturing sector] is significant and robust across a variety of specifica-
tions and strategies for constructing control groups that mitigate endogeneity concerns. In con-
trast, we find little evidence for plant- or firm-level productivity effects from M&A activity on
average, nor for other efficiency gains often cited as possible from M&A activity, including
reallocation of activity across plants or scale efficiencies in non-productive units of the
firm.”).
314 See Arndt Christiansen & Wolfgang Kerber, Competition Policy with Optimally Differ-
entiated Rules Instead of “Per Se Rules vs. Rule of Reason,” 2 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON.
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In the realm of merger law, the Supreme Court’s presumption in United
States v. Philadelphia National Bank should be reinvigorated. The Court
held that a horizontal merger that produces a firm with a market share of
greater than thirty percent is presumptively illegal.315 While Philadelphia
National Bank involved a merger in which the two firms had combined
shares well above twenty percent,316 the Court indicated that a merger ex-
ceeding this lower threshold could be presumptively illegal as well.317 The
merging parties could rebut this presumption by establishing business justifi-
cations for their combination.318 Although the Philadelphia National Bank
decision has not been formally overruled, the agencies’ shift toward increas-
ingly fact-driven merger standards has weakened the force of this
precedent.319
An agency and judicial re-embrace of this previous standard320 would
simplify and enhance the transparency of merger law and restore its role as a
deterrent. This structural presumption would advance the incipiency standard
in merger law and prevent harms from mergers before they occur.321 While
agencies would still have to define relevant markets under the Philadelphia
National Bank rule, the complexity of merger reviews would be greatly di-
minished. For one, these reviews would be significantly shortened and be
much less dependent on competing speculations about the future develop-
ment of markets. Armed with a simple rule rather than a standard that de-
mands an exhaustive industry study and impossible projections of the future,
the antitrust agencies, for example, would not have to spend more than a
year investigating mergers in highly concentrated markets—as they rou-
tinely do now.322
Importantly, firms in highly concentrated markets would be put on clear
notice: a merger that created an entity with a share greater than twenty per-
215, 241 (2006) (“The highest benefits can be reaped by finding simple and robust rules,
which are able to solve most of the competition problems without causing high regulation
costs.”).
315 United States v. Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 364 (1963); see also John
Kwoka, The Structural Presumption and the Safe Harbor in Merger Review: False Positives,
or Unwarranted Concerns? 48 (Ne. Univ. Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper, 2016), http://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2782152 (finding that structural presumptions of
illegality are highly accurate in identifying anticompetitive mergers under the efficiency
standard).
316 Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 364.
317 Id. at 364 n.41.
318 Id. at 363.
319 See Steven C. Salop, The Evolution and Vitality of Merger Presumptions: A Decision-
Theoretic Approach, 80 ANTITRUST L. J. 269, 276 (2015).
320 The agencies and courts, on occasion, still rely on the Philadelphia National Bank
structural presumption. See, e.g., Polypore Int’l, Inc. v. FTC, 686 F.3d 1208, 1216 (11th Cir.
2012).
321 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 252, at § 1
(“[C]ongressional intent that merger enforcement should interdict competitive problems in
their incipiency and that certainty about anticompetitive effect is seldom possible and not re-
quired for a merger to be illegal.”).
322 See, e.g., Emily Steel, Under Regulators’ Scrutiny, Comcast and Time Warner Cable
End Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/25/business/media/
comcast-time-warner-cable-deal.html [https://perma.cc/2WEF-FVRQ].
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cent would have to show credible business justifications to overcome the
presumption of illegality.323 A simple rule that lay observers could under-
stand would prevail.  Leading oligopolists would have less confidence pur-
suing five-to-four or four-to-three mergers and would be less likely to
propose them in the first place. Sophisticated corporate counsel would no
longer be able to manipulate the amorphous and subjective Horizontal
Merger Guidelines to the advantage of large firms in concentrated mar-
kets.324 For example, if Philadelphia National Bank were the governing
merger test today, it is hard to imagine that two firms with a joint national
market share in excess of forty percent would even contemplate merging,325
let alone propose to merge with high confidence in completing the deal.326
In the realm of monopolization, presumptions should replace the cur-
rent rule of reason and other unstructured inquiries, including in the context
of exclusive dealing, predatory pricing, refusals-to-deal, or tying. To an ex-
tent, U.S. law already recognizes the logic of this stricter test for monopo-
lists. The courts have stated that monopolists have less freedom of action
because “there is no market constraint on the monopolist’s behavior.”327 The
late Justice Scalia, despite being an ardent critic of antitrust law generally
and monopolization claims specifically,328 stated that “[b]ehavior that might
otherwise not be of concern to the antitrust laws—or that might even be
viewed as procompetitive—can take on exclusionary connotations when
practiced by a monopolist.”329 Moreover, something akin to a presumption
of illegality applies in the area of tying (conditioning the purchase of one
product on the purchase of another). The Court has held that tying by a firm
with market power in the tying product market is per se illegal because “an-
ticompetitive forcing is likely.”330
Applying a presumption of illegality to exclusive dealing, refusals-to-
deal, and below-cost pricing by dominant and near-dominant firms would
further the goal of protecting consumers and small suppliers and maintaining
open markets. For instance, U.S. law should treat pricing below short-term
323 See Salop, supra note 319, at 273–74.
324 See Frankel, supra note 312, at 166; Stucke, supra note 273, at 1454–56.
325 Grunes & Stucke, supra note 310, at 54.
326 Cf. Vipal Monga, AT&T Is Paying the Biggest Breakup Fee Ever, WALL ST. J. (Dec.
19, 2011), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2011/12/19/att-is-paying-the-biggest-breakup-fee-ever/.
327 LePage’s, Inc. v. 3M, 324 F. 3d 141, 152 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (citation omitted).
328 See Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 412
(2004) (describing antitrust as “sometimes [having] considerable disadvantages”); id. at 407
(describing monopoly power as “an important element of the free-market system”).
329 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 488 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted).
330 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16 (1984), abrogated in part by
Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006); see also Collins Inkjet Corp. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 781 F.3d 264, 271–72 (6th Cir. 2015) (“The tie falls foul of antitrust law
if the seller has appreciable economic power in the tying product market and the arrangement
affects a substantial volume of commerce in the tied market. . . . A tying arrangement that falls
foul of these criteria and lacks a valid business justification is anticompetitive because it tends
to force more efficient competitors out of the tied product market.”) (internal citations
omitted).
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cost by dominant or near-dominant firms as illegal in the absence of credible
business justifications.331 Similar presumptions of illegality should apply
when a firm possessing dominance or on the cusp of dominance ties up
distributors or final customers through exclusive dealing arrangements, ref-
uses to grant access to essential facilities, or ties two distinct products
through contractual or technical means. These forms of conduct may be neu-
tral or even beneficial when practiced by a non-dominant firm in a competi-
tive market. However, they take on a radically different complexion when
undertaken by a monopolist or near-monopolist and should be permitted
only under extraordinary circumstances.332
The antitrust agencies and courts should look to European Union abuse
of dominance law for a model to emulate. The European Union applies a
presumption of illegality to conduct practiced by a monopolist that has ex-
clusionary potential.333 EU law has imposed special obligations on dominant
firms that preclude them from erecting artificial market barriers.334 Competi-
tion law in the European Union establishes “a principle of freedom of non-
dominant firms to trade without artificial obstacles constructed by dominant
firms, and carries an assumption that preserving this freedom is important to
the legitimacy of the competition process and is likely to inure to the benefit
of all market players, competitors and consumers.”335 Dominant firms can
engage in certain types of conduct only if they have credible business rea-
sons for doing so.336 Otherwise, they run afoul of the presumption in favor of
markets open to all comers. The EU’s focus on protecting both consumers
and rivals from powerful businesses is consonant with the objectives ex-
pressed by the drafters of U.S. antitrust laws.337
Exclusive territories, resale price maintenance, and similar distribu-
tional restraints have immediate and longer-term anticompetitive effects and
theoretical business justifications of limited real-world relevance. As a prac-
tical matter, these distributional restraints give large retailers and manufac-
turers the power to dictate the development of consumer goods markets.338
For example, resale price maintenance, under which a manufacturer sets a
contractual floor on the retail price of its products, can limit intrabrand com-
331 See generally Sandeep Vaheesan, Reconsidering Brooke Group: Predatory Pricing in
Light of the Empirical Learning, 12 BERK. BUS. L.J. 81 (2015).
332 See, e.g., Jonathan M. Jacobson, Exclusive Dealing, “Foreclosure,” and Consumer
Harm, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 311, 355 (2002) (“At the extreme, an exclusive dealing arrangement
can create or maintain a complete monopoly.”).
333 See, e.g., Case T-155/06, Tomra Sys. ASA v. Comm’n, 2010 E.C.R. II-4361 ¶ 208
(holding that exclusivity rebates by a dominant firm are illegal in the absence of an objective
justification); Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche v. Comm’n, 1979 E.C.R. 461 ¶¶ 89–90 (same).
334 See, e.g., Case T-65/98, BPB Indus. v. Comm’n, 1993 E.C.R. II-389 ¶¶ 65–68.
335 Eleanor M. Fox, What Is Harm to Competition? Exclusionary Practices and Anticom-
petitive Effect, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 371, 395 (2002).
336 See, e.g., Hoffmann-La Roche, 1979 E.C.R. 461 ¶¶ 89–90 (same).
337 See supra Part V.A.
338 See John J. Flynn & James F. Ponsoldt, Legal Reasoning and the Jurisprudence of
Vertical Restraints: The Limitations of Neoclassical Economic Analysis in the Resolution of
Antitrust Disputes, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1125, 1144 (1987).
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petition, raise consumer prices, and impede new entry in the retail sector.339
Used in sectors with dominant retailers that play a gatekeeper function, re-
sale price maintenance can have a pro-competitive effect.340 But in other
instances it can be misused. This is because with protected profits, retailers
are likely to put less pressure on wholesalers and manufacturers to cut their
prices over the longer term.341 Furthermore, under a resale price maintenance
regime, retailers with a lower cost structure cannot pass their cost advan-
tages through to consumers in the form of lower prices and expand their
market share using their most potent sales tool—discounting.342 This restric-
tion on price competition impedes the emergence of lower-cost retail for-
mats and can preserve non-competitive retail market structures.343
Yet, based on a stylized view of retail competition and the purported
threat of “free-riding” on point-of-sale services such as product demonstra-
tions at a store, the Supreme Court has held that these restraints on competi-
tion should be subject to the rule of reason and has made them de facto
legal.344 For the small fraction of products requiring retail sales support, the
promotion of point-of-sale services, such as product demonstrations, can be
achieved through other less restrictive means, such as manufacturers grant-
ing promotional allowances for full-service retailers.345 The beneficial uses
of distributional restraints, including resale price maintenance, have not been
sufficiently documented—or are limited to sufficiently few circumstances—
to warrant the permissive standard that currently exists.346
Exclusive territories have similar anticompetitive effects. By limiting
the geographical proximity of retailers selling the same brand, exclusive ter-
ritories limit all forms of intrabrand competition—both price and non-price
339 See Pamela Jones Harbour, A Tale of Two Marks, and Other Antitrust Concerns, 20
LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 32, 43 (2007).
340 One example of such a situation is e-books, where Amazon initially controlled ninety
percent of the market. By introducing agency pricing—a form of vertical pricing restraint—
publishers were able to make the e-book market more competitive. See Lina Khan, Amazon’s
Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2017).
341 See Robert L. Steiner, How Manufacturers Deal with the Price-Cutting Retailer: When
Are Vertical Restraints Efficient?, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 407, 441–42 (1997).
342 Warren S. Grimes, A Dynamic Analysis of Resale Price Maintenance: Inefficient Brand
Promotion, Higher Margins, Distorted Choices, and Retarded Retailer Innovation, 55 ANTI-
TRUST BULL. 101, 126–27 (2010).
343 Marina Lao, Resale Price Maintenance: The Internet Phenomenon and Free Rider Is-
sues, 55 ANTITRUST BULL. 473, 509 (2010).
344 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 891–92 (2007);
Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 (1977).
345 See Warren S. Grimes, The Path Forward After Leegin: Seeking Consensus Reform of
the Antitrust Law of Vertical Restraints, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 467, 478 (2008).
346 See Alexander MacKay & David Aron Smith, The Empirical Effects of Minimum Re-
sale Price Maintenance 3 (2014), http://home.uchicago.edu/mackay/files/The%20Empirical%
20Effects%20of%20MRPM.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y4PF-MENT] (“Our results indicate that
prices and quantities have indeed changed as a result of Leegin. We find that 8.4 percent of
products exhibited a statistically significant price increase in our treatment states, with a me-
dian increase of 5.3 percent. Additionally, 9.4 percent of products experienced declining quan-
tities. As a result of Leegin, products were most likely to see a price increase combined with a
quantity decrease. This combination indicates movement along the demand curve and suggests
the exercise of market power.”).
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competition.347 Due to the greater distance between rival sellers, retailers
have a diminished incentive to compete on both price and non-price
dimensions.
Given the likely loss of retail competition from vertical restraints and
low likelihood of offsetting consumer benefits, practices such as resale price
maintenance and exclusive territories should be subject to a relatively strict
legal standard or, at minimum, a structured legal test. For example, the agen-
cies and courts could hold resale price maintenance and exclusive territories
to be presumptively illegal. This standard would reflect the high risk of harm
from these practices. The European Union applies such a standard to resale
price maintenance and to exclusive territories.348 Unlike the per se standard
that governed resale price maintenance until 2007 and established conclusive
illegality,349 however, a presumption of illegality would allow businesses to
rebut the presumption by offering credible business justifications.350 They
could overcome the presumption by showing that the restraint is reasonably
necessary to achieve a beneficial end, such as the provision of point-of-sale
services.
C. Possession of Highly Damaging Monopoly and Oligopoly Power
Should Be Challenged
The antitrust agencies should use their existing legal authorities or seek
additional authorities from Congress to challenge the possession of damag-
ing monopoly and oligopoly power by firms. The specific types of monopoly
and oligopoly power that should be challenged are those that last for an
extended period of time or result in substantial harm, such as in a market for
essential goods and services with highly inelastic demand. In contrast to the
present law governing dominant firms, this legal power would not require
“bad acts” on the part of the firm possessing market power;351 rather, an
uncompetitive market structure that imposes substantial injury on the public
would itself be challenged. Under the proposed “no-fault” monopoly and
oligopoly doctrine, firms found to possess monopoly or oligopoly power that
inflicts substantial injury and cannot be justified on operational grounds,
such as economies of scale, would face antitrust liability.
347 See William S. Comanor, Vertical Arrangements and Antitrust Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1153, 1160 (1987).
348 Commission Regulation 330/2010 of Apr. 20, 2010, 2010 O.J. (L 102), http://eur-lex
.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=URISERV:cc0006&from=EN [https://perma
.cc/3WNT-95PS].
349 Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), overruled by
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
350 Lao, supra note 343, at 511; see also Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F. 3d 29,
35–36 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Commission must determine whether it is obvious from the
nature of the challenged conduct that it will likely harm consumers. If so, then the restraint is
deemed ‘inherently suspect’ and, unless the defendant comes forward with some plausible (and
legally cognizable) competitive justification for the restraint, summarily condemned.”).
351 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966).
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Market power that persists for an extended period of time—say, for at
least five years—imposes substantial costs on the public in the form of
overcharges on consumer prices or depressed payments to producers or
workers. Sometimes this monopoly or oligopoly power persists due to a dis-
crete set of bad acts by the monopolists or oligopolists that exclude competi-
tors. Examples of such bad acts include below-cost pricing and preventing
rivals from accessing customers or essential distribution channels. In these
instances, eliminating these artificial barriers to competition can restore
competition to the market. In other cases, monopoly and oligopoly power
persist due to no apparent bad practice352 or myriad bad practices enabled by
the firms’ underlying power.353 Under these circumstances, the options under
current law are either to do nothing or to initiate lengthy litigation that guar-
antees little except steady income for lawyers and economists.354 Because
current law is ill-equipped to tackle these particular problems, let alone
quickly, the public suffers under the burden of monopoly355 and oligopoly
power that persists.
In other instances, monopoly or oligopoly power may arise intermit-
tently or only temporarily but inflict tremendous harm. A classic example is
market power in restructured electricity markets. Due to the highly inelastic
nature of demand for electricity, generators with market power can unilater-
ally raise market prices. During the California electricity crisis in 2000 and
2001, generators created artificial shortages of electricity to drive up its
price—without any indication of collusion.356 Similar unilateral withholding
could occur in markets for essential medicines.357 The dramatic increase in
the price of the EpiPen, for example, appears to be the product of monopoly
power.358  Although, as currently interpreted, the antitrust laws require evi-
dence of collusion or other bad act before condemning this type of withhold-
ing behavior,359 the harm to the public is real and often severe. The
electricity price spikes and rolling blackouts that hit California fifteen years
352 See John J. Flynn, Do the Proposals Make Any Sense from a Business Standpoint? Pro
No-Conduct Monopoly: An Assessment for the Lawyer and Businessman, 49 ANTITRUST L. J.
1255, 1264–65 (1980) (the fixation on conduct in monopolization cases can lead to courts
finding “no monopoly power where there is monopoly power”).
353 See, e.g., United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 167–68 (D.D.C. 1982)
(“There is evidence which suggests that AT&T’s pattern during the last thirty years has been to
shift from one anticompetitive activity to another, as various alternatives were foreclosed
through the action of regulators or the courts or as a result of technological development.”).
354 See Flynn, supra note 352, at 1265.
355 See Alfred F. Dougherty, Jr. et al., Elimination of the Conduct Requirement in Govern-
ment Monopolization Cases, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 83, 87 (1980).
356 See Wolak, supra note 191, at 430.
357 See Albert A. Foer, Section 5 as a Bridge Toward Convergence, 8 ANTITRUST SOURCE
1, 5 (2009).
358 Carolyn Y. Johnson & Catherine Ho, How Mylan, the Maker of EpiPen, Became a
Virtual Monopoly, WASH. POST (Aug. 25, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
economy/2016/08/25/7f83728a-6aee-11e6-ba32-5a4bf5aad4fa_story.html [https://perma.cc/
DQ2K-GXQ2].
359 Foer, supra note 357, at 4.
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ago,360 and the monopolistic pricing of the EpiPen, illustrate the consumer
costs of market power.361
The focus on durable monopoly and oligopoly would also shift the fo-
cus of current dominant firm law away from bad acts and toward market
structure. The antitrust agencies should only challenge the market power of
firms that impose substantial injury on the public, due either to persistent
market power over a prolonged period of time or to large magnitude of harm
in a short period of time. And even firms found to possess this type of mar-
ket power would be allowed to show that asset divestitures and other restruc-
turings would result in the loss of operational efficiencies.362 Given these
demanding legal standards for when firms could be found liable, the risk that
no-fault monopoly and oligopoly cases would diminish the competitive zeal
of businesses—most of which are unlikely ever to possess anything even
approaching injurious monopoly or oligopoly power—appears remote.363
D. Merger and Monopoly Remedies Should Focus on Maintaining and
Restoring Competitive Market Structures
Stronger antitrust rules must be paired with effective remedies in public
enforcement actions if markets are to be competitive. Even very strong re-
strictions on conduct are unlikely to be effective if the subsequent remedies
are weak. Legal victories are certain to be pyrrhic when “liability is found;
but ineffective remedies are imposed and competitive outcomes are not al-
tered very much.”364 For example, even under a stricter merger enforcement
regime, companies may pursue anticompetitive mergers if they need to make
only minor concessions to get through the nominally tough merger review
process. To promote competitive markets and the citizen interest standard,
the antitrust agencies must seek to maintain and restore competitive market
structures. In the merger context, an effective approach would mean en-
joining mergers in their entirety rather than accepting divestitures or conduct
remedies. In monopolization matters, structural remedies must be favored
over complex, quasi-regulatory behavioral solutions.
While the agencies wisely prefer divestitures to conduct remedies in the
case of horizontal mergers, the defects of this approach—even from an effi-
ciency perspective—are apparent. Retrospective studies suggest that struc-
tural remedies often fail to maintain competition.365 A landmark FTC study
in 1999 found that, in a quarter of reviewed divestitures, “the buyers [were]
360 See Wolak, supra note 182, at 29.
361 Johnson & Ho, supra note 358.
362 If the defendant cannot be split into competing entities without the loss of important
operational efficiencies, policymakers should consider price regulation or public ownership as
a means of controlling the persistent market power.
363 See Dougherty et al., supra note 355, at 94.
364 William S. Comanor, The Problem of Remedy in Monopolization Cases: The Microsoft
Case as an Example, 46 ANTITRUST BULL. 115, 132 (2001).
365
KWOKA, supra note 313, at 120.
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not operating viably in the relevant market”366 and so competition was not
preserved following a merger.367
While FTC divestiture remedies may have improved following the
study, two spectacular failures in recent years raise continued doubts about
their efficacy. In the mergers between Hertz and Dollar Thrifty in 2012368
and Albertsons and Safeway in 2015,369 the FTC required the merging enti-
ties to divest assets to address competition concerns in local markets. In both
instances, the acquiring entities proved to be incapable of replacing the lost
competition and filed for bankruptcy less than a year after the FTC blessed
the divestitures. And in the cruelest of ironies and a stinging rebuke to the
FTC, in both instances the merging firms ended up buying back some of the
entities originally divested.370
Importantly, neither remedy’s failure came as a surprise to observers. In
Hertz/Dollar Thrifty, the entity that Hertz divested—Advantage Rent a
Car—did not appear to be viable from the beginning. Advantage was
stripped of cars and the support of being under the Hertz umbrella.371 A
rental car consultant described the divestiture as akin to “taking a two-year
old and saying ‘OK, now you’ve got to go to kindergarten and play Little
League.”372 On top of inadequate financial and logistical capabilities, Ad-
vantage’s new management and ownership appeared to lack the knowhow to
run a successful car rental business.373 In the meantime, as Advantage
floundered, the Big Three in the car rental market raised prices at the highest
366
BUREAU OF COMPETITION OF THE FED. TRADE COMM’N, A STUDY OF THE COMMIS-
SION’S DIVESTITURE PROCESS 10 (1999), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/
merger-review/divestiture.pdf [https://perma.cc/4FRV-5KKV].
367 The FTC is in the process of conducting a follow-up merger remedies study that “will
focus on 90 merger orders issued by the Commission between 2006 and 2012.” Remedy Study,
FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/policy/studies/remedy-study [https://perma.cc/G78
J-Y8WQ] (last visited Dec. 14, 2016).
368 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Requires Divestitures for Hertz’s Proposed
$2.3 Billion Acquisition of Dollar Thrifty to Preserve Competition in Airport Car Rental Mar-
kets (Nov. 15, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/11/ftc-requires-
divestitures-hertzs-proposed-23-billion-acquisition [https://perma.cc/33RJ-MUW6].
369 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Requires Albertsons and Safeway to Sell 168
Stores as a Condition of Merger (Jan. 27, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-re-
leases/2015/01/ftc-requires-albertsons-safeway-sell-168-stores-condition-merger [https://per
ma.cc/E47H-5YKR].
370 David McLaughlin, Hertz Set to Buy Advantage Locations, Undercutting FTC, BLOOM-
BERG (Apr. 18, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-04-17/hertz-set-to-buy-
advantage-locations-undercutting-ftc [https://perma.cc/7A57-DZ45]; Brent Kendall & Peg
Brickley, Albertsons to Buy Back 33 Stores It Sold as Part of Merger With Safeway, WALL ST.
J. (Nov. 24, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/albertsons-to-buy-back-33-stores-it-sold-as-
part-of-merger-with-safeway-1448411193.
371 Brent Kendall & Jacqueline Palank, How the FTC’s Hertz Antitrust Fix Went Flat,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 8, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303330204579
246281764302824.
372 Id. (quoting Neil Abrams).
373 See David McLaughlin et al., Hertz Fix in Dollar Thrifty Deal Fails as Insider Warned,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 29, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-11-29/hertz-fix-
in-dollar-thrifty-deal-fails-as-insider-warned [https://perma.cc/PX6X-PHR3].
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rate since the start of the Great Recession.374 Perversely, Hertz went on to
reacquire some of the Advantage locations it had divested.375
The remedy in the Albertsons/Safeway case is arguably even harder to
fathom. To allay the FTC’s concerns, the merging entities sold 146 Albert-
sons stores in towns and cities in the Western United States, where they
competed with a Safeway, to a small supermarket chain called Haggen.376
Following this acquisition, the number of Haggen stores increased from 18
to 164.377 Even a casual observer could have predicted that Haggen would
have great difficulty expanding its storefronts nearly ten-fold in a very short
period of time. The skeptics have been proven right. Haggen struggled to
integrate the new stores and, despite its reorganization efforts in bankruptcy,
may be forced to liquidate.378 Underscoring how the remedy backfired, Al-
bertsons has reacquired a number of the stores it sold through the bankruptcy
process.379
Even if divestitures could be perfectly tailored and if they preserved
competition in narrow markets in every instance, they would fail to advance
the citizen interest standard. As they have in recent decades, large companies
would still grow larger through consolidation, notwithstanding minor modi-
fications to address the antitrust agencies’ efficiency concerns. Businesses
could use their greater size to coordinate with rivals across a number of
markets and also to engage in exclusionary conduct to preserve their market
power. In addition, their greater size would give them more power over our
general political economy—an outcome that the congressmen and senators
debating and drafting the antitrust statutes sought to forestall.380
To promote Congress’s broad vision of protecting consumers and sup-
pliers, maintaining open markets, and dispersing private power, the antitrust
agencies should establish a strong presumption in favor of enjoining mergers
in concentrated industries. This remedy would be more effective in ensuring
that competition does not wane. As a practical matter, it is not apparent that
the antitrust agencies are capable of crafting good remedies—especially
given that as the economy becomes more and more concentrated, the num-
ber of credible buyers of divested assets steadily diminishes.381 If, for exam-
ple, Haggen was indeed the most qualified buyer of Albertsons supermarkets
374 Id.
375 McLaughlin, supra note 370.
376 Brent Kendall, Haggen Struggles After Trying to Digest Albertsons Stores, WALL ST. J.




379 David Dayen, Antitrust Incompetence from the FTC, as Albertson’s/Safeway Divesti-
ture Goes Awry, NAKED CAPITALISM (Nov. 17, 2015), http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2015/
11/antitrust-incompetence-from-the-ftc-as-albertsonssafeway-divestiture-goes-awry.html
[https://perma.cc/GN5Y-RKFH].
380 See supra Part V.A.
381 See, e.g., Grunes & Stucke, supra note 310, at 82 (discussing the difficulty of finding a
buyer that is both a viable competitor and not a large incumbent in the wireless industry to
remedy the competition problems in the AT&T/T-Mobile transaction).
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in Western cities for the sake of maintaining competition, it would raise seri-
ous doubts about the general pool of capable supermarket operators that are
not already oligopolists in their own right. More importantly, the current
focus on horizontal market overlaps reflects an unduly narrow conception of
competitive harms. Stopping mergers would help maintain market structures
that are not only more conducive to protecting consumers, producers, and
workers from market power, but would also preserve open markets and pre-
vent excessive concentration of private power in the economy and society.
In addressing monopolization of markets, structural solutions should be
favored.382 They allow for a one-time fix and create or restore a market in
which multiple firms exist and competition can develop. Conduct remedies,
in contrast, may treat only the symptoms of the problematic monopoly,383
and are prone to being incomplete, ambiguous, and vulnerable to evasion.384
Companies subject to these ongoing remedies have a powerful motive to
sidestep them, including through the exercise of overt and subtle power over
regulators,385 as a means of perpetuating their profitable dominance.386 While
the challenges are not necessarily insurmountable, the antitrust agencies and
courts are not institutionally well-suited to monitor and enforce complex
conduct remedies.387 This task, insofar as it is feasible, is more appropriate
for industry regulators and public utility commissions.388
The conduct remedies in the Microsoft litigation in both the United
States and Europe exemplify this quasi-regulatory approach. Mandatory in-
teroperability and licensing agreements appear to have fostered greater com-
petition in the desktop operating system and applications markets.389 Yet,
major questions remain on whether the complex regulatory undertaking was
worth all the effort.390
382 To be sure, conduct remedies may be sufficient or the only viable fix in some cases. In
simple monopolization cases focused on discrete instances of bad conduct, the agencies may
be able to craft a straightforward conduct remedy that addresses the defendant’s exclusionary
conduct. In other instances, a structural solution may be infeasible due to the operations of the
monopolist—for example, splitting a monopolist with a single centralized factory may be diffi-
cult and impractical. See Peter C. Carstensen, Remedies for Monopolization from Standard Oil
to Microsoft and Intel: The Changing Nature of Monopoly Law from Elimination of Market
Power to Regulation of Its Use, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 815, 842 (2012) (noting important distinc-
tion between “cases challenging the conduct of a monopolist whose monopoly is itself not
being challenged and those that challenge that monopoly itself.”).
383 See Comanor, supra note 364, at 124.
384 See John E. Kwoka & Diana L. Moss, Behavioral Merger Remedies Evaluation and
Implications for Antitrust Enforcement, 57 ANTITRUST BULL. 979, 1002 (2012) (observing that
“the antitrust agencies do not have the resources of sector regulators to monitor and oversee
compliance”).
385 See K. Sabeel Rahman, What Clinton and Sanders Are Really Fighting About, ATLAN-
TIC (Feb. 5, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/the-allure-and-limits-
of-managerialism/460146/ [https://perma.cc/22R3-7F7B].
386 See Comanor, supra note 364, at 124–25.
387 See Kwoka & Moss, supra note 384, at 1002.
388 Id. at 1001–02.
389 See Carstensen, supra note 382, at 838.
390 See Harry First & Andrew I. Gavil, Re-Framing Windows: The Durable Meaning of the
Microsoft Antitrust Litigation, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 679, 759 (“[M]ore than a decade after the
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In cases in which the monopolist’s power gives it a host of options to
exclude competitors, enforcers and courts must address the root of the prob-
lem—the monopolist’s very existence. Rather than undertake a game of
“whack-a-mole” that is often beyond their institutional capabilities, they
should restructure the monopolist’s business operations. Structural remedies
include dividing a monopolist into multiple horizontal competitors, as some
commentators proposed in the United States’ case against Microsoft.391 An-
other option is to separate a monopolist in vertically related lines of business
into separate entities.392 Structural remedies typically do require some super-
vision to ensure compliance. This oversight would involve bright lines—
meaning, for example, that the monopolist could not re-enter a certain mar-
ket following a divestiture—and would not be nearly as complicated and
intrusive as regulating terms of interconnection or licensing terms over an
extended timeframe.
The vertical separation approach is embodied in the settlement in the
monopolization case against AT&T, in which the phone giant agreed to sep-
arate its local phone monopoly from its long-distance and equipment opera-
tions.393 The purpose of this remedy was to prevent AT&T from leveraging
its then-natural monopoly in local phone service into the potentially compet-
itive long-distance and equipment markets.394 For twelve years—from 1984
until the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996—Judge Harold
Greene monitored the local phone companies’ compliance with line-of-busi-
ness restrictions that prevented them from expanding into the long-distance
and equipment markets.395 Judge Greene appears to have performed his du-
ties well and ensured the continued effectiveness of the original structural
remedy.396
E. The Antitrust Agencies Must Be Subject to Greater
Transparency Duties
Increasing agency accountability is vital for ensuring that greater
agency resources and stronger legal standards will lead to more vigorous
enforcement. Improvements in substantive law are likely to be toothless if
Justice Department reached its first consent decree with Microsoft, Microsoft’s share of the
Intel-compatible PC operating system market remains above ninety percent.”).
391 See, e.g., Robert J. Levinson, R. Craig Romaine & Steven C. Salop, The Flawed Frag-
mentation Critique of Structural Remedies in the Microsoft Case, 46 ANTITRUST BULL. 135,
136–37 (2001).
392 See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 64 (D.D.C. 2000),
vacated 253 F.3d 34, 101–03 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (ordering Microsoft to be split into operating
system and application software entities).
393 United States v. W. Elec. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 226 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d sub nom.
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
394 See W. Elec. Co., 552 F. Supp. at 187.
395 Joseph D. Kearney, From the Fall of the Bell System to the Telecommunications Act:
Regulation of Telecommunications Under Judge Greene, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1395, 1413–14
(1999).
396 Id. at 1472.
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the antitrust agencies can continue to operate behind a veil of secrecy. Anti-
trust watchers and other members of the public must be allowed to deter-
mine whether the agencies are acting in accordance with substantive law.  At
present, the antitrust agencies remain some of the least accountable in gov-
ernment. Officials are not required to explain to the public why they did not
challenge a particular merger, or reckon with cases in which a merger that
they did not challenge led to predicted harms.397 Nor do agencies have to
explain why they ended extensive investigations with no action. A promi-
nent antitrust attorney has remarked that “[t]here are few government func-
tions outside the CIA that are so secretive as the merger review process.”398
Two recent matters illustrate the opacity surrounding antitrust investiga-
tions. In 2012, for example, the Justice Department quietly closed a three-
year investigation into Monsanto, whose anti-competitive activities had been
documented by journalists and described by state officials as egregious.399
Upon shutting down its inquiry, the DOJ made no public announcement;
only a short press release from Monsanto conveyed the news.400 In the matter
involving Google’s search practices, the FTC terminated its investigation
with some voluntary agreements, effectively clearing the company of all an-
titrust wrongdoing.401 Only through an inadvertent Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) leak did the public later learn that the FTC’s antitrust lawyers
had concluded that Google likely violated antitrust laws on three counts, and
had recommended bringing a suit.402
One way to make agencies more accountable would be by requiring
them to conduct publicly available retrospective reviews, assessing how
their merger predictions actually played out. The President could create anti-
trust inspector general units within the DOJ and FTC, whose job would in-
volve evaluating how specific mergers had affected factors like choice,
quality, profit margins, and conduct with suppliers. This would be especially
397 See Jesse Eisinger & Justin Elliott, These Professors Make More than a Thousand
Bucks an Hour Peddling Mega-Mergers, PROPUBLICA, Nov. 16, 2016, https://www.propublica
.org/article/these-professors-make-more-than-thousand-bucks-hour-peddling-mega-mergers
[https://perma.cc/D4KM-GQ8W] (“Once a merger is approved, nobody studies whether the
consultants’ predictions were on the mark. The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission do not make available the reports that justify mergers, and those documents can-
not be obtained through public records requests.”).
398 Id.
399 See Christopher Leonard, Monsanto Seed Biz Role Revealed, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec.
14, 2009); Lina Khan, How Monsanto Outfoxed the Obama Administration, SALON (Mar. 15,
2013), http://www.salon.com/2013/03/15/how_did_monsanto_outfox_the_obama_administra
tion/ [https://perma.cc/KGX5-29PZ].
400 Ian Berry & David Kesmodel, U.S. Closes Antitrust Investigation into Seed Industry,
Monsanto, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 16, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887
324735104578123631878019070.
401 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Google Agrees to Change Its Business Practices to
Resolve FTC Competition Concerns (Jan. 3, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-re-
leases/2013/01/google-agrees-change-its-business-practices-resolve-ftc [https://perma.cc/
G3EQ-CGVY].
402 See Brody Mullins, Rolfe Winkler & Brent Kendall, Inside the U.S. Antitrust Probe of
Google, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 19, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/inside-the-u-s-antitrust-
probe-of-google-1426793274.
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useful for identifying errors in judgment when designing merger remedies, a
particular site of recent failure. In two instances discussed earlier—the
Hertz/Dollar Thrifty and Albertsons/Safeway mergers—divestiture remedies
that the FTC predicted would sufficiently preserve competition proved to-
tally ineffective. In each case, not only did the firm acquiring the divested
assets bleed money as a result of the acquisition—weakening it as a compet-
itor—but also the divesting firm ended up re-acquiring some of the original
assets.403 For this magnitude of failure to go entirely unexamined—both
within and outside the agency—is a recipe for weak and repeatedly feckless
antitrust policy.
Another way to enhance agency transparency is to pass comprehensive
FOIA reform—as Congress attempted through the FOIA Oversight and Im-
plementation Act of 2014. If adopted, the legislation would have codified the
mandate for government agencies to “adopt a presumption in favor of dis-
closure, in order to renew their commitment to the principles embodied in
FOIA and to usher in a new era of open Government.”404 Congress’s reform
agenda included a focus on Exemption 5, which protects from mandatory
disclosure inter-agency and intra-agency documents that would be privileged
from discovery in litigation.405 In practice, the FTC and other agencies liber-
ally use Exemption 5 to keep documents privileged or highly redacted.406
Calls to make the antitrust agencies more transparent and accountable
to the public are not new.407 Instituting as routine mechanisms by which the
public can track the agencies’ actions and document the long-term results of
action or inaction would help both identify and recognize the public payoffs
of successful enforcement and let public interest groups, advocacy organiza-
tions, and journalists both celebrate victories and hold the agencies
accountable.
403 See Kendall & Palank, supra note 371; Kendall & Brickley, supra note 370; see also
Brent Kendall & Jacqueline Palank, How the FTC’s Hertz Antitrust Fix Went Flat, WALL ST. J.
(Dec. 8, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023033302045792462817643
02824; Brent Kendall & Peg Brickley, Albertsons to Buy Back 33 Stores It Sold as Part of
Merger With Safeway, WALL ST. J, (Nov. 24, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/albertsons-
to-buy-back-33-stores-it-sold-as-part-of-merger-with-safeway-1448411193.
404 See Jason Leopold, It Took a FOIA Lawsuit to Uncover How the Obama Administra-
tion Killed FOIA Reform, VICE (Mar. 9, 2016), https://news.vice.com/article/it-took-a-foia-
lawsuit-to-uncover-how-the-obama-administration-killed-foia-reform [https://perma.cc/JE54-
BQ5X].
405 H.R. Rep. No. 89-1497 (1966), S. Rep. No. 89-813 (1965), and S. Rep. No. 88-1219 6-
7, 12-14 (1964), cited in ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., LITIGATION UNDER THE FEDERAL OPEN
GOVERNMENT LAWS 2010, at 144 (Harry A. Hammitt et al. eds., 2010).
406 Leopold, supra note 404.
407 For example, in its extensive review of U.S. antitrust enforcement in the 1970s, Ralph
Nader’s Study Group suggested that top antitrust officials disclose to the public meetings be-
tween business representatives and enforcement officials. See MARK J. GREEN, ET AL., THE
CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM 62 (1972).
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CONCLUSION
Amid discussions exploring the factors contributing to the extreme eco-
nomic inequality we face today, the role of monopoly and oligopoly power
is underappreciated. It is as if the disregard of distributional consideration in
current antitrust analysis has blinded scholars and policymakers to the con-
nection altogether. Our argument is not that antitrust should embrace redis-
tribution as an explicit goal, or that enforcers should harness antitrust in
order to promote progressive redistribution. Instead we hold that the failure
of antitrust to preserve competitive markets contributes to regressive wealth
and income distribution and—similarly—that restoring antitrust is likely to
have progressive distributive effects. As we have sketched out, oligopolistic
market structures and anticompetitive practices in a host of key industries
may be transferring billions of dollars upwards—a politically, socially, and
economically troubling outcome.
It is important to trace contemporary antitrust enforcement and the phi-
losophy underpinning it to the Chicago School intellectual revolution of the
1970s and 1980s, codified into policy by President Reagan. By collapsing a
multitude of goals into the pursuit of narrow “economic efficiency,” both
scholars and practitioners ushered in standards and analyses that have heav-
ily tilted the field in favor of defendants. Critically, though, this counterrevo-
lution can be undone. Executive and judicial action can revive antitrust
policy to promote competitive markets—by protecting consumers and small
suppliers from wealth-redistributing monopolies, oligopolies, and cartels;
maintaining open markets; and dispersing economic and political power.
Over the last year, politicians and policy elites have started to recognize
the fact that current antitrust policy has failed, yielding high concentration
and low competition across sectors.408 In June 2016, Senator Elizabeth War-
ren urged Americans to revive an antitrust movement, a return to our foun-
dational belief “that concentrated power anywhere was a threat to liberty
everywhere.”409 Even the top antitrust official at the Justice Department re-
cently made comments distancing herself from the consumer welfare stan-
dard in favor of something closer to the “citizen interest” standard we
outline.410 Antitrust reform carries the potential to elicit bipartisan support.411
Adopting the approach we detail would not only keep with Congress’s origi-
nal intent, but also advance the economic, political, and social interests of
the vast majority of Americans.
408 See Oversight of the Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Antitrust, Competition Policy & Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th
Cong. (2016); see also Oversight of the Antitrust Enforcement Agencies: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial & Antitrust Law of the H. Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 114th Cong. (2015).
409 Elizabeth Warren, Sen. from Mass., Remarks at the 2016 Global New America’s Open
Markets Program: Competition in the American Economy (June 29, 2015).
410 Acting Assistant Attorney Gen. Renata Hesse of Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Div., Open-
ing Remarks at 2016 Global Antitrust Enforcement Symposium (Sept. 20, 2016).
411 Dayen, supra note 3.
